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Abstract 
Children’s understanding of emotions in victimization situations has been 
investigated as a way to study children’s moral motivation. To assess this 
understanding, researchers have used a procedure known as the happy victimizer task 
in which children are asked to attribute emotions to victimizers who have performed an 
immoral action. In the present study I argue that this task is flawed in a number of ways 
that compromise the validity of the conclusions drawn from this research for the study of 
children’s morality. Following this critique, I propose an improved version of the task, the 
anticipated emotions version, in which the story character has not yet performed the 
immoral action and children are asked about emotions the character might feel. I 
analyze children’s attribution of emotions in the anticipated emotions version of the task 
and compare these with their performance on the standard task. In order to investigate 
possible processes that underlie children’s emotion attributions in victimization 
scenarios, I also investigate relations among children’s attribution of emotions, their 
social understanding (i.e., understanding of interpretation and mixed emotions), and their 
social history (i.e., parental style and number of siblings). Finally, I investigate how 
children’s emotion attributions are related to their moral behavior. One hundred and 
forty-four 5- to 8-year-old Portuguese children participated in this study. Results show a 
developmental shift from the attribution of positive to the attribution of negative emotions 
in the anticipated emotions version of the task when children attribute emotions to a 
hypothetical victimizer, and a decline of the attribution of positive emotions when 
children attributed emotions to themselves as if they were the victimizers. Children also 
attributed less positive emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in the anticipated emotions 
compared to the standard version of the task. Attributions of emotions were not related 
to children’s social understanding or to the assessed aspects of children’s social history. 
Also, no relation was found between children’s attribution of emotions and behavior. 
Implications of these results for the study of children’s moral development and moral 
behavior are discussed and future research is proposed. 
Keywords:  Happy Victimizer; Emotion attributions; Moral development; Moral 
behavior. 
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Chapter 1.  
 
Introduction 
The social, emotional, and moral world in which children exist is an essential 
aspect of their development.  Furthermore, children’s understanding of the emotional 
consequences of actions may influence their tendency to engage in those actions.  In 
particular, children’s understanding of the emotions experienced in victimization 
situations has been of considerable research interest because this understanding may 
influence children’s prosocial and antisocial behavior in such situations (Malti & 
Krettenauer, 2012; Nunner-Winkler, 2013). 
To study the emotions that children expect someone to experience after 
transgressing a moral rule, researchers have investigated children’s understanding of 
emotions in victimization scenarios, through a procedure that is now known as the happy 
victimizer task (Arsenio & Fleiss, 1996; Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Gasser & Keller, 2009; 
Krettenauer, 2013; Lourenço 1997; Malti & Keller, 2009; Murgatroyed & Robinson, 1993, 
1997; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988).  In this task, children are told a story about a 
protagonist who transgressed a moral rule in order to obtain a personal gain (e.g., 
pushing another child off a swing in order to use the swing or stealing a chocolate from 
another child) and they are asked to attribute emotions to that protagonist—the 
victimizer--after he or she has committed the immoral action.  Based on children’s 
emotion attributions to the victimizer, implications for children’s moral motivation have 
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been inferred such that the attribution of positive emotions is interpreted as indicating 
children’s lack of motivation for moral action, whereas the attribution of negative 
emotions is viewed as suggesting children’s motivation to behave morally. 
However, a careful look at the happy victimizer task indicates that this task is 
flawed in a number of ways that compromise the validity of the conclusions drawn from 
this research.  In the present study I analyze these flaws and propose an improved 
version of the happy victimizer task (i.e., the anticipated emotions version) to evaluate 
children’s understanding of emotions in victimization scenarios.  As it is unclear which 
aspects of children’s social understanding and children’s social lives underlie children’s 
emotion attributions in victimization scenarios, I then expand the study of children’s 
understanding of emotions in victimization scenarios in the following ways.  I investigate 
(1) whether results from previous research on children’s attribution of emotions in 
victimization scenarios are replicated in a Portuguese sample when certain controlled 
procedures are followed; (2) how children attribute emotions in victimization scenarios in 
an improved version of the happy victimizer task (i.e., the anticipated emotions 
attributions version), and compare these attributions with children’s attribution of 
emotions in the standard version of the task; (3) whether aspects of children’s social 
understanding (i.e., understanding of interpretation and mixed emotions) as well as 
aspects of children’s social history (i.e., parents’ ways of talking about disciplinary 
situations and children’s number of siblings) are related to the way children attribute 
emotions in victimization scenarios; and (4) whether children’s emotion attributions in the 
anticipated emotions attribution scenarios are related to their moral behavior (i.e., 
prosocial and antisocial behavior). 
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In the first section of the present study, I briefly describe how the issue of moral 
motivation has been addressed within the major theories of moral development.  In the 
second section I describe how the study of children’s emotion understanding in 
victimization scenarios emerged as a way of investigating moral motivation.  I then 
describe how studies of children’s understanding of emotions in victimization scenarios 
have been conducted and the major results that have been reported.  In the third 
section, I analyze methodological problems of previous studies and propose to 
investigate whether previous results are replicated when these methodological problems 
are addressed. In the fourth section I analyze flaws with the standard happy victimizer 
task and propose to explore how children attribute emotions in an improved version of 
the task, the anticipated emotions version, as a way of expanding the study of children’s 
attribution of emotions in victimization scenarios.  In the fifth section I describe how 
previous studies have investigated children’s moral reasoning associated with children’s 
attribution of emotions. I then propose a way of expanding the study of children’s 
justifications for their emotion attributions in order to obtain further and more precise 
information about children’s moral reasoning.  In the sixth section I explore whether 
children’s understanding of emotions in victimization scenarios is related to some 
aspects of their social understanding as assessed by their understanding of 
interpretation and mixed emotions, and aspects of their social history as assessed with 
parents’ talk about disciplinary situations and children’s number of siblings.  Finally, in 
the seventh section I examine whether children’s attribution of emotions in the 
anticipated emotions version of the task is related to children’s moral behavior. 
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1.1. An introduction to the Happy Victimizer Phenomenon 
The question about what leads a person to act morally has been addressed 
within developmental psychology in different ways, but so far no one has offered a 
coherent and clear answer.  Although Piaget (1932) pioneered the study of moral 
development, it was Kohlberg’s (e.g., 1984) extension of this work that has been more 
influential.  Whereas Piaget was interested in the emergence of practical social action 
and the later developing ability to reflect on and talk about such activity, Kohlberg 
focused on moral reasoning.  Kohlberg considered the way individuals think about what 
should be done in a moral situation to be a central aspect of motivation for moral action.  
However, studies that have investigated the relation between moral reasoning and moral 
action (e.g., Blasi, 1980) have shown a gap between these two aspects of morality, 
pointing to the need to investigate other aspects beyond moral reasoning in order to 
understand moral motivation.  In his work, Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984) 
proposed a model to explain the link from moral reasoning to moral action.  He argued 
that the first step is the deontic judgment of what is right in that situation (i.e., an 
individual’s considerations regarding what should be done in a moral dilemma and why).  
This is followed by the individual’s judgment regarding whether he or she is responsible 
to perform the act.  Individuals might know what should be done in moral situation, but if 
they do not feel responsible to act in accordance with such a prescriptive judgment, they 
might fail to act in accordance with it.  The third step in the model consists of nonmoral 
factors (e.g., courage) required to actually be able to perform the act. Empirical research 
has shown that a sense of responsibility increases across moral stages, and the relation 
between moral reasoning and moral action tends to be stronger in higher than lower 
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stages (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984).  However, it remains unclear what leads some, but 
not others, to act in accordance with what they consider to be right.  
In a similar vein, Rest (1984) proposed a model with four components to explain 
the processes that need to be followed for a person to act morally.  More specifically, 
Rest postulates that first the person has to be able to recognize the situation as moral 
(moral sensitivity).  Then, the person produces a moral judgment about what should be 
done (moral judgment).  The individual, then, has to have the determination to act in 
accordance to the moral judgment that was produced (moral motivation).  And finally, the 
person has to have the character to be able to take that course of action (moral 
character). 
Although Kolhberg and Rest have considered other variables beyond moral 
reasoning to explain what would lead a person to act in accordance with what he or she 
considers to be the right thing to do, the answer to the question of what motivates 
individuals to behave morally is still far from being understood (Nunner-Winkler, 2013). 
1.1.1. The Happy Victimizer Phenomenon 
Another approach to understanding what motivates individuals to act morally is to 
study individuals’ understanding of the emotional consequences of actions. Drawing on 
functionalist theories of emotions (e.g., Bretherton, Fritz, Zahn-Waxler, & Ridgeway, 
1986), according to which emotions are internal systems that motivate human action, 
some researchers have investigated the type of emotions children expect to be 
experienced when a moral rule is transgressed as a key aspect of motivation for moral 
action (Gasser, Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Latzko, & Malti, 2013; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 
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1988).  To investigate children’s understanding of the type of emotions experienced by 
victimizers, children have been presented with victimization stories (i.e., the happy 
victimizer task) that depict a story character who has performed an immoral action and 
has achieved a personal gain (e.g., a child who pushed another child of a swing in order 
to play with the swing) (Arsenio, 1988; Barden, Zelko, Duncan, & Masters, 1980; 
Chaparro, Kim, Fernández, & Malti, 2013; Gasser & Keller, 2009; Keller, Lourenço, 
Malti, & Saalbach, 2003; Murgatroyed & Robinson, 1993, 1997; Nunner-Winkler & 
Sodian, 1988).  
These victimization stories confront children with two dimensions. A personal 
dimension, based on the victimizer’s satisfied desire (e.g., getting the swing), and a 
moral dimension, based on the transgression of a moral rule (e.g., pushing another child 
off a swing).  When children attribute emotions to the victimizer they are assumed to 
reveal which one of these two conflicting dimensions they consider to be more important 
in determining the emotional state of the victimizer.  The attribution of positive emotions 
is thought to suggest that children value the personal aspect of the situation more than 
the moral aspect. That is, children may recognize the immorality of the action but they do 
not expect the moral transgression to produce a negative emotional outcome. 
Conversely, the attribution of negative emotions in victimization scenarios indicates that 
children value the moral aspect of the situation.  That is, children recognize the 
immorality of the situation and expect the moral transgression to produce a negative 
emotional outcome (e.g., Arsenio, 2010; Arsenio, Gold, & Adams, 2006; Malti, 
Gummerum, & Buchmann, 2007).  If an individual values the personal more than the 
moral dimension of the situation and expects to feel good after transgressing a moral 
rule in order to achieve a personal gain (e.g., steal a chocolate) he or she may be more 
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prone to perform the act.  In contrast, if the individual values the moral dimension and 
expects to feel bad after having committed the immoral action he or she may be less 
likely to do it (Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988).  Moreover, researchers have argued that 
from the point of view of moral development, the attribution of positive emotions to the 
victimizer suggests that moral rules may not be understood as personally binding, 
whereas the attribution of negative emotions suggests that children not only know the 
moral rules but are also personally committed to them (Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988). 
Results from these studies describe the happy victimizer phenomenon, young 
children’s tendency to attribute positive emotions to victimizers (e.g., the victimizer feels 
good because he or she is playing with the swing), and its developmental shift, around 6 
to 7 years of age, from an attribution of positive to the attribution of negative emotions 
(e.g., the victimizer feels sad because he or she pushed another child off the swing; e.g., 
Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Keller et al., 2003; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988). Despite 
the finding of this developmental shift and the increased number of studies conducted in 
the last two decades on the happy victimizer phenomenon and its relation to children’s 
moral behavior, the reasons that the happy victimizer phenomenon occurs and its 
meaning for children’s morality remain controversial and unexplored (Malti & 
Krettenauer, 2012). For instance, some researchers (Arsenio, Gold, & Adams, 2006) 
have suggested that the developmental shift from the attribution of positive to the 
attribution of negative emotions results from children’s developing abilities in 
understanding and coordinating conflicting perspectives.  According to this interpretation 
of the happy victimizer phenomenon, young children attribute positive emotions to the 
victimizer because they fail to coordinate the emotional state of the victimizer with the 
state of the victim.  In contrast, older children attribute negative emotions because they 
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believe that the state of the victimizer is influenced by the state of the victim.  For others 
(e.g., Harris, 2006), this developmental shift reflects older children’s increasing 
awareness that it is socially less acceptable for someone to feel good after he or she 
performs an immoral action than to feel bad. 
Although the processes that underlie the attribution of positive and negative 
emotions in victimization situations remains uncertain (Malti & Krettenauer, 2012; 
Nunner-Winkler, 2013), children’s understanding of emotions in these sort of scenarios 
is thought to be a key aspect of their moral motivation.  Results from several studies 
offer support for this perspective.  More precisely, despite the consistent findings of a 
developmental shift from the attribution of positive to the attribution of negative emotions, 
there is also significant variability within the same age groups in the way children 
attribute emotions to victimizers.  Moreover, it has been reported that this variability is 
related to children’s moral behavior.  Concerning the variability of emotion attributions 
across ages, for example, some studies show that most 4- to 6-year-old children also 
attributed negative emotions to victimizers (Chaparro et al., 2013; Keller et al., 2003; 
Lourenço, 1997; Whitesell & Harter, 1989). In other studies it was found that older 
children and even adults persisted in attributing positive emotions to the victimizer 
(Murgatroyed & Robinson, 1993, 1997).  Therefore, although there is a tendency for a 
developmental shift from the attribution of positive to the attribution of negative emotions 
to a victimizer, variability of attribution of positive and negative emotions within the same 
age groups and across ages, also exists.  Along with these results, in a recent meta-
analysis researchers found that emotion attributions predict moral behavior in 4- to 20-
year-olds (Malti & Krettenauer, 2012).  More precisely, in this meta-analysis researchers 
found that across all age groups the attribution of positive emotions in victimization 
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scenarios is related to anti-social behavior, whereas the attribution of negative emotions 
is related to prosocial behavior. 
In sum, research on the happy victimizer phenomenon has shown that although 
there is a tendency for a developmental change from the attribution of positive to 
negative emotions in victimization scenarios, there is also a significant variability within 
age groups in the way children attribute emotions to victimizers and a relation between 
children’s attribution of emotions in victimization scenarios and their moral behavior. 
However, these results and their interpretation for children’s moral development must be 
regarded with caution, because, from my perspective, the study of children’s 
understanding of emotions in victimization scenarios is flawed in several ways. In the 
following sections I address problematic aspects of the happy victimizer studies (i.e., 
methodological procedures under which children’s attribution of emotions in victimization 
scenarios have been investigated, conceptualization of the happy victimizer task, and 
analysis of children’s justifications of their emotions attributions) and propose alternative 
procedures to improve and extend the study of children’s attribution of emotions in 
victimization scenarios.  
1.1.2. Robustness of the Happy Victimizer Phenomenon 
In the happy victimizer studies, researchers are interested in understanding the 
emotions children expect themselves to feel in similar situations (Arsenio, 2010; Nunner-
Winkler & Sodian, 1988).  For that reason, in the happy victimizer stories, story 
characters are presented as being the same age and sex as the child being interviewed. 
This procedure is expected to facilitate children’s identification with the story character 
and thus to induce children to attribute to the hypothetical transgressor the same 
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emotions they would expect to feel in similar situations.  Nevertheless, presenting a 
victimizer as being the same age and sex of the child does not guarantee children’s 
identification with the character.  Thus, researchers developed studies in which children 
were asked to attribute emotions as if they where the protagonist of the story (Keller et 
al., 2003; Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006; Malti, Gasser, & Buchmann, 2008; Malti & Keller, 
2009). Results from these studies showed a considerable reduction of the happy 
victimizer pattern when children attribute emotions to themselves as if they were the 
victimizer, and an increased differentiation between self and other attributions over time.  
Previous studies have also shown that 6- and 8-year-olds, but not 4-year-old 
children, attribute more mixed emotions when their emotion attributions to a hypothetical 
victimizer are probed (Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Lourenço, 1997).  However, most 
studies in the happy victimizer tradition do not probe children’s emotion attributions.  
Also, no studies have probed children’s emotion attributions when they were asked to 
attribute emotions as if they were the victimizer.  This lack of probing raises questions 
regarding the robustness of children’s tendency to attribute positive emotions to 
themselves as if they were the victimizer, as well as the robustness of children’s patterns 
of emotion attributions to hypothetical victimizers. 
With the goal of investigating the strength of children’s patterns of emotion 
attributions across ages and types of victimizers (i.e., hypothetical other vs. the self as 
the victimizer), in the present study children’s attribution of emotions were probed by 
explicitly asking them if the victimizer would feel anything else.  This procedure made it 
possible to identify differences in the ways children attribute emotions to a victimizer that 
are not captured by procedures where children’s emotion attributions are not probed.  
Children who start by attributing positive emotions but also attribute negative emotions 
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after probing reveal a different way of understanding emotions that are experienced in 
victimization situations compared to children who persist in attributing positive emotions, 
and this may reveal differences in moral motivation. In the present study children’s 
attribution of emotions were probed in order to differentiate between “hard core” happy 
victimizers (children who persist in attributing positive emotions across probing) and 
“reluctant" happy victimizers (i.e., children who start by attributing positive emotions but 
also attribute negative emotions with probing). 
All the studies in which children attribute emotions to themselves as if they were 
the victimizer have methodological limitations making it unclear whether children differ in 
the way they attribute emotions to themselves as if they were the protagonist of the 
action (i.e., the victimizer) compared to the way they attribute emotions to a hypothetical 
victimizer.  In a set of studies, children were asked to attribute emotions only to 
themselves as if they were the victimizers (Gasser & Keller, 2009; Malti et al., 2008; 
Malti, Gummerum, Keller, & Buchmann, 2009).  In these studies 5- to 10-year-old 
children mostly attributed negative emotions to themselves in the role of victimizer.  
However, because in these studies children’s attributions of emotions to a hypothetical 
victimizer were not investigated, they do not allow a sound conclusion that the happy 
victimizer pattern of emotion attributions decreases when children attribute emotions to 
themselves as if they were the victimizer, compared to when children attribute emotions 
to a hypothetical victimizer. 
In another set of studies (Keller et al., 2003; Malti, Gummerum, & Buchman, 
2007; Malti & Keller, 2009) children were asked to attribute emotions to a hypothetical 
victimizer as well as to themselves as if they were the victimizer.  Nonetheless, in all 
these studies, children always attributed emotions to themselves after attributing 
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emotions to the hypothetical victimizer.  Due to this design, it is possible that the 
decrease in attribution of positive emotions when they were asked to view themselves as 
the protagonist of the story may be a result of an order effect.  Children may understand 
the second question (the request to attribute emotions to themselves as if they were the 
victimizer) as similar to the first one and therefore change their emotion attributions 
because they believe that their response to the first question was not satisfactory, 
otherwise, they would not be asked the same question twice (Siegel, 1999). 
All together, these results seem to point to a decrease in the happy victimizer 
pattern of emotion attributions when children attribute emotions to themselves compared 
to when they attribute emotions to a hypothetical victimizer.  Nevertheless, a controlled 
procedure in which children’s attribution of emotions to a hypothetical victimizer and to 
themselves as if they were the victimizer that is counterbalanced has never been 
conducted.  A counterbalanced procedure would allow testing the decline of the 
attribution of positive emotions when children attribute emotions to themselves as if they 
were the victimizer.  
Thus, the first goal of the present study is to replicate the finding of a decrease in 
the happy victimizer pattern when children attribute emotions to themselves as if they 
were the victimizers in a methodologically controlled procedure and when children’s 
attributions are probed.  For this purpose, children are asked to attribute emotions to a 
hypothetical story character in the standard version of the happy victimizer task and also 
to attribute emotions as if they were the victimizer in the story (counterbalanced), with 
probing of emotion attributions.  I expect to replicate the finding of a decrease in 
attribution of positive emotions to themselves when children are asked to consider 
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themselves to be the victimizer, compared to the attribution of positive emotions to a 
hypothetical victimizer. 
1.2. Standard and Anticipated Emotions Versions of the 
Happy Victimizer Task 
So far, all of the studies that have investigated children’s attribution of emotions 
in victimization scenarios asked children to attribute emotions to a victimizer who had 
already performed an action and had reached the desired goal (e.g., how does the 
victimizer feel after having pushed another child off the swing?).  This means that 
because the action was intentionally performed, responding to the test question is based 
on the link between intention and outcome, and so attributing positive emotions to the 
victimizer is an appropriate way to answer the question.  The fact that the protagonist 
has already completed the action suggests that for he or she the personal desire was 
more salient than the moral rule, otherwise the hypothetical actor would not have 
performed the act of victimization. In this sense, there is no reason to think that someone 
who has done what he or she wanted to do and reached a desired goal should feel sad. 
Attributing negative emotions to the victimizer would require the child to think about the 
victimizer as remorseful, someone who acted intentionally and achieved a goal, but 
afterwards regretted having acted in that way.  There is nothing in the task that might 
lead children to think about the victimizer in this way.  For this reason, it is possible that 
some children may attribute positive emotions because the victimizer acted in order to 
reach the desired goal and therefore he or she must value personal gain more than the 
moral transgression, even though the children themselves may believe that the moral 
transgression would make themselves feel bad. 
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Yuill, Perner, Pearson, Peerbhoy, and van den Ende, (1996) reported that 5-
year-old children are able to understand emotions in victimization scenarios from a 
personal and from a moral perspective. In this study, that was designed to investigate 
children’s understanding of desire, the authors report that 5-year-old children are able to 
understand that someone may feel happy when a desired goal is attained, even if that 
goal is immoral and that a responsible person may feel sad after committing a moral 
transgression.  These results support my previous critique according to which it is 
possible that in response to the standard version of the happy victimizer task some 
children as young as 5 years of age may attribute positive emotions to the victimizer 
based on their understanding that the victimizer feels happy once he or she has 
achieved the desired goal.  This possibility compromises possible conclusions that can 
be drawn from children’s attribution of emotions in victimization scenarios, namely from 
children’s attributions of positive emotions, and may weaken the relation between 
children’s understanding of emotions in victimization scenarios and their moral behavior.  
A way of improving the happy victimizer task is to present a story in which 
intentions and outcomes are not related.  From my perspective, an improved way to 
assess the kind of emotions children expect victimizers to experience could be achieved 
by presenting children with situations in which a hypothetical protagonist has not yet 
acted and ask children how the protagonists in the stories would expect to feel if he or 
she acts in an immoral way—the anticipated emotions version of the task.  In this 
improved task the link between intention and outcome is not present, making it more 
likely that the attribution of emotions will be in accordance with children’s own 
perspective rather than the victimizer’s perspective.  
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So far, no one has explored how children attribute emotions to a protagonist 
before the victimization action had been performed.  Namely, no one has investigated 
whether there is a developmental change in the way children attribute emotions in the 
anticipated emotions version of the task, as observed in the standard task, whether 
children differ in the way they attribute emotions to a hypothetical victimizer and to 
themselves in the anticipated emotions version of the task, and whether children differ in 
the way they attribute emotions in the anticipated emotions version of the task compared 
to the emotions they attribute in the standard version. 
The second goal of the present study is to investigate how children attribute 
emotions in the anticipated emotions version of the task and compare this with their 
attribution of emotions in the standard version, both when children attribute emotions to 
a hypothetical victimizer and when they attribute emotions to themselves as if they were 
the victimizer.  For this purpose, children will be presented with the standard and 
anticipated emotion versions of the task and asked to attribute emotions to a 
hypothetical story character and to attribute emotions as if they were the victimizer in the 
story, following the procedure of probing all the emotion attributions.  
As the link between the character's intentions and outcome is weaker in the 
anticipated emotion version of the task, I expect to find no differences across age groups 
in the way children attribute emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in the anticipated 
emotion version of the task.  That is, I do not expect to find a developmental change 
from the attribution of positive to the attribution of negative emotions when children 
attribute emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in the anticipated emotions version of the 
task, across age groups.  Based on previous findings that report a decrease in the happy 
victimizer pattern of emotion attributions when children attribute emotions to themselves 
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as if they were the victimizer, I expect to replicate this decrease of the happy victimizer 
pattern of emotion attributions in the anticipated emotions version of the task.  Finally, 
comparing emotion attributions between the standard and anticipated emotions version 
of the task, I expect that children will attribute less positive emotions or will persist less in 
attributing positive emotions when they attribute emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in 
the anticipated emotions version than in the standard version of the task.  I expect to find 
no differences in the way children attribute emotions to themselves as if they were the 
victimizer comparing the standard and anticipated emotions versions of the task. 
1.3. Children’s Justifications of Negative Emotions 
Attributions and Moral Development 
In the happy victimizer studies children have been asked to attribute emotions to 
a victimizer and to justify their emotion attributions.  Children’s justifications enable 
distinguishing different types of morality that underlie their emotion attributions, and 
these moral justifications have been also related to children’s moral behavior (Arsenio & 
Fleiss, 1996; Hughes & Dunn, 2000).  Children typically justify attributions of positive 
emotions by referring to the victimizer’s gain (e.g., the victimizer feels good because he 
is playing with the swing).  Children generally justify the attribution of negative emotions 
based on one of two concerns: punishment (e.g., the victimizer is sad because he is 
afraid of being punished), and morality (e.g., the victimizer is sad because pushing 
another child of a swing is not right).  Justifications based on moral reasons (e.g., the 
protagonist is sad because he did something that is not right) have been interpreted as a 
sign of a more advanced morality compared to justifications based on concerns for 
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punishment because children seem to be more autonomously committed to a moral 
code compared to avoiding punishment.  
However, moral justifications should be analyzed in more detail because they 
may be informed by two distinct reasons revealing different moral orientations.  Moral 
justifications may be given based on the understanding that breaking a moral rule is not 
right per se or because breaking a moral rule is not right because it leads to an unfair 
loss or harm for the victims.  The first reason suggests a rule oriented, heteronomous 
morality, and the second suggests a more autonomous morality in which the other’s 
perspective is taken into account (Piaget, 1932).  It is difficult, however, to disentangle 
these two kinds of morality based on only simple answers given by the children to a 
single question (e.g., why does the protagonist of the story feel happy/sad?).  For 
example, answers such as the victimizer “feels sad because he pushed the other child 
off the swing” do not permit this distinction.  It is possible that behind this justification, 
lies a rule oriented morality (i.e., he is sad because he broke a rule), or a more 
sophisticated morality based on coordination of perspectives and consideration of 
fairness and others’ welfare (i.e., he is sad because the other child lost the swing or is 
hurt).  Most studies that investigate the happy victimizer phenomenon do not probe 
children’s justifications for their emotion attributions and thus do not disentangle these 
different moral orientations that may underlie justifications that have been viewed as 
morally oriented.  To disentangle which of these two kinds of justifications underlie 
children’s initial moral justifications, probing questions such as “why is it not right to push 
the other child off the swing” need to be asked. 
In three studies involving 5- to 10-year-old children (Malti et al., 2008; Malti et al., 
2009; Malti & Keller, 2009) researchers have probed justifications for children’s emotion 
 28 
attributions.  However, in these studies, justifications considered to be moral were only 
coded as moral without disentangling the different moral orientations that may underlie 
them.  In the present study I probe 5- to 8-year-old children’s moral justifications to avoid 
confounding justifications based on a rule-oriented morality with concerns for others’ 
rights and welfare. 
The third goal of the present study is to investigate whether 5- to 8-year-old 
children’s moral justifications observed in previous studies are linked to different moral 
orientations.  To reach this goal, children’s justifications are probed.  Based on previous 
knowledge about children’s moral development (Piaget, 1932) I expect to observe an 
increase in justifications based on concerns for others’ rights and welfare across age 
groups when children justify their emotion attributions in all versions of the task except 
when children attribute emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in the standard version.  In 
this version, as children may understand the task in different ways it is not possible to 
predict any results. 
1.4. Attribution of Emotions and Social Understanding 
Another question that arises regarding children’s emotion attributions and 
justifications in victimization situations concerns the psychological processes that 
underlie these attributions (Gasser & Keller, 2009; Malti & Krettenauer, 2012; Malti et al., 
2008; Menéres & Lourenço, 2004).  In this study, I aim to investigate how children’s 
understanding of interpretation as well as children’s understanding of mixed emotions 
may be related to their attribution of emotions to a victimizer in victimization scenarios.  
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Some researchers (e.g., Arsenio et al., 2006) have suggested that the attribution 
of negative emotions involves consideration of the impact of the victim’s perspective on 
the victimizer’s emotional state.  This means that the attribution of negative emotions 
involves a more sophisticated ability to understand conflicting perspectives. Conversely, 
the attribution of positive emotions seems to be only focused on the victimizer’s 
perspective (i.e., the obtained gain) and so should be related to a lower ability in 
understanding and coordinating perspectives.  Understanding interpretation—an 
advanced level of social understanding—refers to the understanding that different 
people may have different perspectives about the same event, which involves the 
understanding of conflicting perspectives.  For this reason, children’s attribution of 
emotions in victimization scenarios may be related to children’s understanding of 
interpretation.  More precisely, I expect that children with more advanced understanding 
of interpretation will attribute negative emotions or will persist less in attributing positive 
emotions across probing questions, whereas children who attribute positive emotions 
and persist in this attribution across probing will show a less advanced understanding of 
interpretation.  I expect to find this association in all versions of the task, except in the 
standard version when children attribute emotions to a hypothetical victimizer.  In this 
version of the task, as I argued before, it is possible that there are children who attribute 
positive emotions based on the perspective of the victimizer (i.e., the victimizer feels 
happy, otherwise he wouldn’t have stolen the chocolate) and not based on their own 
perspective.  Therefore, it is not possible to predict what kind of results would be 
expected due to the ambiguity in how children may interpret this version of the task. 
Concerning the relation between children’s justifications and their understanding 
of interpretation, when children attribute emotions to a victimizer, it is expected that 
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negative emotions justified by concerns with others’ loss and harm will be associated 
with higher levels of understanding of interpretation.  In contrast, I expect that positive 
emotions justified by self gain as well as negative emotions justified by normative 
reasons and self cost will be associated with lower levels of social understanding.  
To my knowledge, only one study (Malti, Gasser, & Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, 
2010) has investigated the relation between children’s moral reasoning in victimization 
scenarios and children’s understanding of interpretation. In their study, Malti and 
colleagues interviewed 5-, 7-, and 9-year-old children and reported a negative 
correlation only between 9-year-olds’ understanding of interpretation (Lalonde & 
Chandler, 2002) and moral reasoning.  In Malti and colleagues’ study, the moral 
reasoning measure combined scores obtained by children’s moral evaluation regarding 
the moral transgression (i.e., is it right or not to commit that moral transgression and 
why), children’s emotion attributions and justifications for children’s emotion attributions 
(i.e., how does the protagonist feel and why?) to a hypothetical victimizer in the standard 
version of the task.  In the present study, I investigate whether children’s attribution of 
emotions in victimization scenarios and children’s understanding of interpretation as well 
as the association between children’s justifications and children’s understanding of 
interpretation are related, when emotion attributions and justifications are probed, and 
when the associations between children’s understanding of interpretation and both 
children’s attribution of emotions and justifications are analyzed separately.  Also, in the 
present study I explore whether children’s understanding of interpretation is related to 
their attribution of emotions and justifications, not only in the standard version of the 
task, but also in the anticipated emotions version of the task.  I also assess children’s 
understanding of interpretation with a different task (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996) from 
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the task that was used previously by Malti and colleagues (Malti et al., 2010) to 
investigate the relation between these variables.  
In line with research that aims to understand the processes that underlie 
children’s attribution of emotions in victimization scenarios, in the present study I also 
investigate the relation between children’s attribution of emotions and their 
understanding of mixed emotions (Harter & Buddin, 1987; Whitesell & Harter, 1989).  
More specifically, I investigate whether children who attribute positive emotions and 
persist more in that pattern of attribution across probing questions, lack an 
understanding of mixed emotions when compared with children who resist less in 
changing from attributing positive emotions to negative emotions with probing.  
The fourth goal of the present study is therefore to investigate whether there is a 
relation between the different patterns of children’s emotion attributions to victimizers 
and individual differences in children’s social understanding assessed by children’s 
understanding of interpretation and mixed emotions.  I expect to observe positive 
associations between children’s understanding of interpretation and their attribution of 
emotions, in all versions of the task except in the standard version when children 
attribute emotions to a hypothetical victimizer.  I also expect to find a positive association 
between children’s understanding of interpretation and children’s justifications in all 
versions of the task.  In addition, I expect that children who persist less in attributing 
positive emotions to the victimizer, will show a more sophisticated understanding of 
mixed emotions in all versions of the task except in the standard version, when children 
attribute emotions to a hypothetical victimizer.  I do not expect to find positive 
associations between the referred variables, when children attribute emotions to a 
hypothetical victimizer in the standard version of the task because it is possible that in 
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this version children attribute or persist more in attributing positive emotions to the 
victimizer based on the victimizers’ perspective.  For this reason it is not possible to 
predict what kind of results would be expected concerning children’s attribution of 
emotions and their understanding of interpretation as well as children’s attribution of 
emotions and their understanding of mixed emotions due to the ambiguity in how 
children may interpret this version of the task.  
1.5. Emotion Attributions and Children’s Social History – 
Parenting Styles and Siblings 
Although children’s understanding of the emotional consequences of immoral 
actions has been considered a key aspect of children’s moral motivation, so far, no 
studies have investigated aspects of children’s social interactions that may underlie the 
development of different ways of understanding emotions in victimization scenarios. 
Parental styles, as well as number of siblings, have been documented as being 
important variables that are correlated with some dimensions of social development, 
such as false belief understanding and understanding of emotions (e.g., Carpendale & 
Lewis, 2006, for a review). The way parents describe their parental attitudes, as well as 
the way they talk with their children about social and moral events are associated with 
the development of their children’s understanding of social and moral situations (e.g., 
Garner, 2012; Peterson & Slaughter, 2003; Ruffman, Perner, & Parkin, 1999; Turnbull, 
Carpendale, & Racine, 2008).  The present study aims to investigate the relation 
between parents’ ways of talking about disciplinary situations and children’s 
understanding of emotions in victimization situations.  Drawing on previous research on 
parental styles and children’s social and moral understanding, my expectation is that 
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children with parents who encourage them to reflect upon how the victim might feel in 
disciplinary situations will attribute more negative emotions in victimization scenarios 
based on concerns for others compared to children of parents who do not explore 
different perspectives, and instead only discuss victimization behavior as being wrong 
from the perspective of moral rules.  
The number of siblings children have has also been related to their performance 
on false belief tasks (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Perner, 
Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994). Some research has suggested that older siblings but not 
younger siblings facilitate the development of false belief understanding (Lewis, 
Freeman, Kyriakidou, Maridaki-Kassotaki, & Berridge, 1996; Ruffman, Perner, Naito, 
Parkin, & Clements, 1998).  As children’s understanding of victimization scenarios 
involves children’s social understanding, in this study I also investigated possible sibling 
effects in children’s emotion attributions and justifications in victimization scenarios. 
Drawing on previous research, a relation between children’s number of siblings and their 
understanding of victimization scenarios is expected.  More precisely, I expect that 
children with siblings (or older siblings) will attribute more negative emotions and give 
more morally sophisticated justifications in victimization scenarios than children without 
siblings or only with younger siblings.  
In sum, the fifth goal of this study is to investigate the relation between children’s 
emotion attributions and justifications and their social history assessed with parents’ 
ways of talking about disciplinary situations and number of siblings.  I expect to find a 
relation between children’s attribution of emotions and justifications and the way their 
parents talk about disciplinary situations, as well as between children’s attribution of 
emotions and justifications and children’s number of siblings in all versions of the task 
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except in the standard version, when children attribute emotions to a hypothetical 
victimizer because this version of the task may be interpreted by children in different 
ways. 
1.6. Emotion Attributions and Behavior 
The way children think about the emotions experienced in victimization scenarios 
has been considered a motivational force for children’s behavior (Nunner-Winkler, 2013; 
Gasser et al., 2013).  More precisely, children's expectations regarding how a person 
feels after committing an immoral action have been related to their moral action. 
Although results from previous studies that have investigated this association between 
children’s attribution of emotions in victimization scenarios and their moral behavior have 
been inconsistent (e.g., Asendorpf & Nunner-Winkler, 1992; Gasser & Keller, 2009; 
Hughes & Dunn, 2000; Malti & Keller, 2009) in a recent meta-analysis (Malti & 
Krettenauer, 2012) an overall significant association between moral emotion attributions 
and children’s prosocial and antisocial behaviors was reported.  In this meta-analysis, 
the attribution of positive emotions in victimization scenarios was related to anti-social 
behavior, whereas the attribution of negative emotions was related to prosocial behavior. 
The effect sizes of the studies included differed significantly and were small to moderate. 
For instance, the effect size found for predicted antisocial behavior was moderate and 
for predicted prosocial behavior was small.  It was also found that the effect sizes for 
predicted antisocial behavior were larger for self-attributions than for attributions to a 
hypothetical victimizer.  
So far no study has investigated the relation between children’s anticipation of 
emotions in potential victimization situations before the action has been performed and 
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children’s moral behavior.  However, when deciding on a certain course of action, 
considerations about the emotional outcomes of that action occur before not after acting. 
Moreover, because the anticipated emotions version of the task addresses possible 
confounding of the standard version, children’s attribution of emotions to a hypothetical 
victimizer in the anticipated emotions version might be a stronger predictor of children’s 
moral behavior than children’s attribution of emotions to themselves as if they were the 
victimizer.  
Children’s attribution of emotions to themselves as if they were the victimizer 
appears to be a better predictor of their antisocial behavior than their attribution of 
emotions to a hypothetical victimizer (Malti & Krettenauer, 2012).  In the present study I 
expand the study of the relation between children’s understanding of emotions in 
victimization scenarios and their moral behavior by investigating the relation between 
children’s attribution of emotions in the anticipated emotions version of the task and their 
moral behavior. 
The sixth goal of this study is therefore to investigate whether there is a relation 
between children’s probed attribution of emotions and justifications and children’s social 
behavior in the standard and also in the anticipated emotions version of the task. I 
expect to find that children’s attribution of emotions in the anticipated emotions version 
of the task will be related to children’s moral behavior.  Moreover, I expect that children’s 
attribution of emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in the anticipated emotions version of 
the task will be a stronger predictor of children’s moral behavior than children’s 
attribution of emotions to themselves as if they were the victimizer in any version of the 
task or than children’s attribution of emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in the standard 
version. 
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1.7. The Current Study 
In sum, the present study is designed to investigate: (1) whether the finding of a 
decrease in the happy victimizer phenomenon is replicated when children attribute 
emotions to themselves in the standard version of the task when attributions of emotions 
are probed and when controlling for order effects; (2) how children attribute emotions in 
the anticipated version of the task and whether these attributions differ from children’s 
emotion attributions in the standard version; (3) whether children’s moral justifications 
reflect different moral orientations (i.e., based on moral rules versus concern for others) 
when justifications are probed; (4) the relation between children’s attribution of emotions 
justifications and their social understanding assessed with children’s understanding of 
the interpretive nature of mind, and their understanding of mixed emotions; (5) whether 
there is a relation between both children’s attribution of emotions in victimization 
scenarios and the parental style children experienced and the number of their siblings; 
and (6) whether children’s attribution of emotions and justifications in the anticipated 
emotions version of the task are related to their moral behavior. 
The present study expands the study of children’s understanding of emotions in 
victimization situations by (1) proposing an improved version of the happy victimizer 
task; (2) studying a Portuguese sample of 5- to 8-year-old children; (3) investigating how 
children attribute emotions in the anticipated emotions version of the happy victimizer 
task; (4) probing children’s emotions attributions in order to distinguish children who 
persist in attributing positive emotions across probing (the committed, or “hard core,” 
happy victimizers), from children who start by attributing positive emotions to the 
victimizer but are able to attribute negative emotions after probing (the weak, or 
reluctant, happy victimizers), from children who are not happy victimizers because they 
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attribute negative emotions to the victimizer in a first place; (5) probing children’s 
justifications in order to distinguish moral justifications based on rule orientation and 
moral justifications based on concern for the victim; (6) investigating the relation 
between children’s attribution of emotions and justifications and aspects of children’s 
social understanding and social history; and finally, (7) investigating the relation between 
children’s attribution of emotions in the anticipated emotion version of the task and 
children’s behavior. 
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Chapter 2.  
 
Method 
2.1. Participants 
A total of 144 children from 5 to 8 years of age, as well as their teachers and 
parents participated in this study.  Four age groups were formed (5-, 6-, 7-, and 8-year-
olds), with 36 participants in each group, based on participants’ age and grade in school 
(M = 5.6 years, SD = 0.32, for kindergarten; M = 6.3 years, SD = 0.44, for first grade; M 
= 7.6 years, SD = 0.43, for second grade; and, M = 8.6 years, SD = 0.37, for third 
grade). Each of the groups had the same number of boys and girls, and all of the 
participants come from native Portuguese families, who were fluent in Portuguese and 
attended private Portuguese schools in Lisbon.  Sixty-three percent of the children’s 
parents had a university degree and thirty-one percent had a college degree. Six percent 
of the parents had a baccalaureate degree or an advanced vocational diploma. Only 
three of the families contacted did not allow their children to participate in the study. 
2.2. Tasks and Measures 
2.2.1. Victimization Stories 
Victimization stories about pushing and stealing frequently used in previous 
studies of the happy victimizer phenomenon (e.g., Keller et al., 2003; Nunner-Winkler & 
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Sodian, 1988; Malti et al., 2007) were adapted for this study.  Children were presented 
with a standard version of the task in which the protagonist has already performed the 
action (either pushing another child off a swing or stealing chocolate), and an anticipated 
emotions version, in which the protagonist has not yet performed the action.  All of the 
stories were illustrated with a sequence of three cartoons in which the characters were 
depicted so that there was no indication of their emotional states.  There were two sets 
of the same stories, feminine and masculine, so that participants listened to stories with 
characters of the same age and sex as themselves. 
Each child was asked to attribute emotions to a hypothetical victimizer and to 
themselves as the victimizer in situations involving pushing and stealing in the standard 
and anticipated emotions version of the task.  Thus, each child was presented with eight 
stories, four for the standard version, and four for the anticipated emotions version of the 
task (i.e., stealing or pushing, for self and other conditions, in the standard version and in 
the anticipated emotions version of the task).  To make the stories equivalent, the same 
stories in both versions was presented, changing only the names and physical features 
of the characters in the way they were depicted (e.g., hair color and clothes). Everything 
else was kept the same. 
Standard Victimization Stories 
Pushing a Child off a Swing 
This is Marc.  Marc is at the playground playing on the swing (cartoon 1).  
Another boy, John, went to the playground to play with the swing and sees Marc playing 
there (cartoon 2).  John pushed Marc off the swing and plays with it.  Marc lies on the 
ground (cartoon 3). 
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Stealing a Chocolate 
This is Florien and this is Thomas.  They are in the classroom in their 
kindergarten/school, hanging up their coats.  Thomas brought a chocolate to eat at lunch 
time and kept it in the pocket of his coat (cartoon 1).  Later on, Florien goes to Thomas’ 
coat and takes the chocolate (cartoon 2).  At lunch time Thomas goes to his coat to get 
the chocolate and sees that it is not there anymore (cartoon 3). 
Test Questions – Standard Version 
1- Primary emotion attribution – How do you think the protagonist feels in the end of the 
story?  If you were this child, how would you feel in the end of the story?  Why? 
2- Probe of justification’s explanation - Why is it that ______ makes the protagonist feel 
good?  (The space refers to the justification given in the previous answer if that was 
not clear enough.  For example, Why is it that that pushing the other child off the 
swing makes him feel sad?  [if the justification in the previous answer was the 
protagonist feels sad because he pushed the other child off the swing]). 
3- Secondary emotion attribution (only if the child did not attribute opposite emotions in 
question 1) – Could the protagonist/you be feeling anything else too?  Why? 
4- Counter-suggestion (only if the child did not attribute opposite emotions in the 
questions 2 and 3) - A child of your age said that the protagonist was feeling/he 
would feel good/bad.  Do you think that (s)he/you could also feel that?  Why? 
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Anticipated Emotions Stories 
Pushing a Child off a Swing 
This is Anthony.  Anthony is at the playground playing on the swing (cartoon 1).  
Another boy, Max, went to the playground to play with the swing and sees Anthony 
playing there (cartoon 2).  Max looks at Anthony playing with the swing (cartoon 3).  
Stealing a Chocolate  
This is Noah and this is Trevor.  They are in the classroom in their 
kindergarten/school, hanging up their coats (cartoon 1).  Trevor brought a chocolate to 
eat at lunch time, and kept it in the pocket of his coat (cartoon 2).  Later on, Noah 
passes by Trevor’s coat and looks at the chocolate (cartoon 3).  
Test Questions 
1 - Anticipation of emotions before victimization - How is the protagonist going to 
feel if he pushes the other child of the swing/ gets the chocolate?  If you were the 
protagonist of the story, how would you feel if you pushed the other child of the swing/ 
get the chocolate?  Why? 
2 - Probe of justification’s explanation - Why is it that ______ makes the 
protagonist feel ___?/ Why is it that ___ would make you feel ____?  (The space refers 
to the justification given in the previous answer if that was not clear enough. For 
example, Why is it that pushing the other child off the swing makes him/her feel sad? [if 
the justification in the previous answer was the protagonist feels sad because he pushed 
the other child off the swing]). 
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3 - Secondary emotion attribution (only if the child did not attribute opposite 
emotions in question 1) – Could the protagonist/you feel anything else too?  Why?  
4 - Counter-suggestion (only if the child didn’t attribute opposite emotions in the 
questions 2 and 3) - A child of your age said that the protagonist was going to feel/he 
would feel good/bad.  Do you think that (s)he/you could also feel that?  Why? 
2.2.2. Social Understanding Tasks 
Children’s social understanding was assessed with tasks that assess 
understanding of both interpretation and mixed emotions. 
Children’s Understanding of Interpretation 
Three tasks involving ambiguous stimuli, namely, lexical ambiguity, ambiguous 
referential communication, and ambiguous figures, were used to assess children’s 
understanding of interpretation (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). 
Following Carpendale and Chandler’s (1996) procedure, in the lexical ambiguity 
task the child listened to a story about two puppets, Maxi and Mary, who were told to 
wait for a ring.  Then the experimenter asked each of the two puppets what they were 
waiting for.  Each of the puppets said they were waiting for a different sort of ring.  One 
puppet reported to be waiting for a bell to ring and the other puppet claimed to be waiting 
for a diamond ring.  In the ambiguous referential task, there were three cards depicting a 
large red square, a large blue square, or a small red square.  Again, two puppets were 
presented and were told that there was a sticker hidden under the card with the large 
square.  Then the experimenter asked each of the puppets where the sticker was.  One 
of the puppets said it was under the card with the large blue square and the other one 
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said it was under the card with the large red square.  In the ambiguous figures task, 
Jastrow’s (1900) “duck-rabbit” figure (Attneave, 1974) was shown to the two puppets 
and the experimenter asked them what they thought it was.  One of the puppets said it 
was a duck and the other puppet disagreed, claiming it was a rabbit. 
After each one of these situations of conflicting interpretations were presented, 
children were asked the three following questions: an explanation question, “Is it okay for 
Mary to say it is a duck and Maxi to say it is a rabbit?  Why is (isn’t) it okay?”, a 
prediction question, “Now Mary says it is a duck and Maxi says it is a rabbit.  If we 
showed this picture to children in another school would they think it is a duck or a rabbit, 
or wouldn’t you know what they think?”  If the child took a decisive position by saying 
that the other person would think that the ambiguous figure is a rabbit, he or she was 
then asked, “How can you tell what they will think?” and “How sure are you that they will 
think that?”  If the child said “”I don’t know”, he or she was asked “why is it hard to tell 
what they will think?”; and a deviant interpretation question, “Ann, another girl, says it is 
an elephant. Does it make sense for Ann to say it is an elephant, or does in not make 
sense?”  These options were counterbalanced as well as the answers attributed to each 
one of the puppets. 
Children’s Understanding of Mixed Emotions 
To assess children’s understanding of mixed emotions, children were presented 
with two stories, depicting situations able to elicit two contrary emotions, riding a two-
wheel bicycle for the first time, and going to the zoo with the child’s mother but without 
the child’s best friend. 
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Bicycle Story 
“Today Jason’s (Jennifer’s) father is going to help Jason (Jennifer) ride a two-
wheel bicycle for the first time.”  
Zoo Story 
 “Jason’s (Jennifer’s) [counterbalance] mother is taking Jason (Jennifer) and his 
(her) best friend to the zoo today.  But Jason’s (Jennifer’s) best friend calls on the 
telephone and says he (she) can’t go because he (she) is sick. So Jason (Jennifer) and 
his (her) mother will have to go to the zoo without his (her) friend.” 
For each one of the stories, children were asked the following questions: 
“How might Jason (Jennifer) feel about trying to ride a two wheel bicycle for the 
first time/going to the zoo without his (her) friend?”  If the child’s answer was vague, a 
clarification question was asked:  “You said....  Can you tell me more about that?” 
If the child referred to two contrary emotions and justified them correctly, the 
interview ended there.  If the child referred to only one emotion, or two similar emotions, 
the child was asked to think about whether there was something else that the 
protagonist of the story could feel as well as the first emotion the child mentioned, “Is 
there anything else that Jason (Jennifer) might feel at the same time?  Why?”  If the child 
stated an opposite emotion, justifying it correctly, the interviewed ended there.  If the 
child answered that the protagonist of the story didn’t feel anything else, one more probe 
question was asked, stating that the character of the story felt excited and scared (for 
the bicycle story) or happy and sad (for the zoo story), and the experimenter asked why 
would the child feel that way: ”you know what, Jason (Jennifer) felt excited and scared. 
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Why did Jason (Jennifer) feel excited and scared riding the two wheel bicycle for the first 
time?” 
2.2.3. Parenting Styles and Siblings 
Parental styles were assessed through an adaptation of the questionnaire 
designed by Ruffman and colleagues (1999) to assess how mothers deal with six 
disciplinary situations with their children.  Mothers were asked to report what they did or 
would do and say if their own child behaved in a certain way.  An example of the 
disciplinary situations presented is: “Can you remember a time recently when you 
thought your child was lying to you?  What did you (would you) say or do?” An additional 
situation similar to those described in the victimization stories was added to the original 
questionnaire.  This situation was related to pushing another child in the playground. All 
of the other 5 questions were the same as the original version (see Appendix A for the 
complete version of the questionnaire).  
Mothers were asked to fill out a questionnaire with questions about the child’s 
number of younger and older siblings, and their age and sex (see Appendix B). . 
2.2.4. Children’s Behavior 
Children’s behavior was assessed with parents’ and teachers’ answers to 
questionnaires.  Parents evaluated children’s prosocial and antisocial behavior with two 
subscales, the Conduct Problems Scale and the Prosocial Scale of the Strength and 
Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman, 1997).  The SDQ is a measure that has 
revealed good psychometric properties. Its five-factor structure (emotional, conduct, 
hyperactivity-inattention, peer, prosocial) was confirmed and reliability was generally 
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satisfactory, whether judged by internal consistency (mean Cronbach  α .73), cross-
informant correlation (mean: 0.34) or retest stability after 4 to 6 months (mean: 0.62; 
Goodman, 2001). Studies carried out in Portugal provide further evidence of the 
reliability and validity of this instrument (Marzocchi, Capron, Pietro, Tauleria, Duyme, et 
al., 2004).  
Each one of the scales have five items, describing five behavioral situations, and 
each one of these items is rated on a three point scale, “not true”, “somewhat true”, and 
“certainly true” (see Appendix C for the complete version of the scale). 
Teachers reported children’s behaviors with the Aggressive Scale Teacher 
Rating (Dodge & Coie, 1987), rating children from never to almost always, on 6 items 
related to general level of aggression, 3 items concerned with reactive aggression, and 3 
items concerned with proactive aggression (see Appendix D for the complete version of 
the scale). 
All materials were translated from English into Portuguese by a Portuguese 
native speaker and back translated into English by a professional English translator.  
Minor differences were resolved between the two. 
2.3. Procedure 
Parents and teachers were contacted and asked to fill in the questionnaires 
about children’s behavior and parental styles, and return them to the researcher or to the 
teacher in school (this procedure did not provide control over which parent filled out the 
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questionnaire. Although most of them were filled out by the children’s mothers, some 
may be have been filled out by fathers).  
Children were individually interviewed in a spare room at their school.  The 
interviews were audio taped and transcribed.  Each child received a total of eight happy 
victimizer stories, three tasks about interpretation, and two stories about mixed 
emotions. To control for order effects within each age group, a third of the children were 
first presented with the happy victimizer tasks, another third, the understanding of 
interpretation tasks, and another third, the mixed emotions understanding tasks.  After 
having responded to the first set of tasks, half of the children were presented with one of 
the two remaining sets of tasks followed by the other one.  The other half received the 
second and third set of tasks in the reversed order.  For instance, in the group of 
children who received the happy victimizer tasks first, half of that group then received 
the understanding of interpretation tasks, followed by the understanding of mixed 
emotions tasks.  The other half received these two social understanding tasks in the 
reverse order.  This same procedure was used for the other two groups, who received 
first the understanding of interpretation or the understanding of mixed emotions tasks. 
The order of presentation of the different stories, within the happy victimizer, the 
understanding of interpretation, and mixed emotions set of stories were 
counterbalanced.  In the happy victimizer task, there were three factors to be 
considered, version of the task (standard and anticipated emotions), action of the story 
(pushing and stealing), and person of emotion attribution (self and other).  Accordingly, 
half of the children in each age group received the standard version of the stories first 
and the anticipated emotions stories second.  The other half received the anticipated 
emotions stories first, followed by the standard version.  Within all conditions, pushing 
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versus stealing stories and whether children attributed emotions to themselves or to the 
hypothetical protagonist of the story were counterbalanced.  Following these 
considerations, 18 unique permutations were created, based on a Latin Square 
randomized procedure.  Two participants in each group were randomly assigned to each 
one of these eighteen permutations.  The presentation of the three stories for assessing 
the understanding of interpretation and the two stories to assess mixed emotions tasks 
was also counterbalanced. Children were interviewed twice, and in each interview they 
listen to half of the stories referred to above. Each interview had the duration of 
approximately 15 minutes. 
2.4. Coding 
2.4.1. Attribution of Emotions 
In order to test the happy victimizer pattern of attributions, children’s emotion 
attributions were credited 0 points, when they attributed positive emotions and kept 
doing so across probing questions (i.e., confirmed happy victimizers), 1 point, when 
children first attributed a positive emotion, but in response to probing questions also 
stated that the victimizer would feel negative emotions (i.e., “weak happy victimizers”), 
and 2 points when children attributed negative emotions but also attributed positive 
ones, across probing, mixed emotions right away, or when children attributed negative 
emotions, never changing to positive ones across probing questions (i.e., children who 
were never happy victimizers).  Thus, scores ranged from 0 to 2 in each story condition 
with lower scores indicating that children persisted more in attributing positive emotions 
to the victimizer.  Previous studies have used similar coding of emotion attributions (e.g., 
Malti & Keller, 2009; Malti et al., 2008).  Twenty-five percent of all responses were coded 
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by a second rater who was blind to participants’ age and sex, and also to the goals of 
the research.  The inter-rater agreement between the two coders was 100%.  
2.4.2. Justifications 
Drawing on previous studies (e.g., Keller et al., 2003; Malti et al., 2007), 
children’s justifications were coded in one of the following categories: self gain, self-cost, 
normative, and other cost.  Self-gain justifications were based on the gain of the 
victimizer, “I would feel happy because I was playing with the swing”.  Self-cost 
justifications were based on fear of punishment, or on negative consequence for the 
victimizer.  Justifications like “the victimizer feels bad because he is afraid that the 
teacher saw him taking the chocolate” or “the victimizer feels bad because the other 
child won’t play with him anymore” were included in this category.  Normative 
justifications were based on answers in which children referred to norms and rules that 
should be followed but could not explain why those norms and rules should be followed. 
Answers like, “the victimizer feels sad because he did something bad,” or “I would feel 
sad because stealing is bad” were included in this category.  Other cost justifications 
were scored when the justification was based on concerns with the victim’s loss or pain. 
Justifications based on concerns for physical harm, “the victimizer feels sad because the 
other child is hurt”, emotional loss, “the victimizer feels bad because the other child is 
sad”, or object loss, “I would feel sad because the other child doesn’t have the chocolate 
anymore” were included in this category.  
From a moral point of view, self-gain justifications are the least sophisticated 
justifications.  They are only based on the victimizer perspective and his gains, indicating 
that the situation is not seen as a moral one.  Self-cost justifications are slightly more 
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sophisticated emotions.  Although they are also based on the victimizer’s perspective, 
they reveal a moral orientation.  Referring to being afraid of being punished shows that 
the child understands the situation as a moral one.  That is, the child understands that a 
moral rule was broken (something that seems not to be understood by children who 
attribute positive emotions and justify them with the victimizer’s gains).  However, these 
kind of justifications are based on fear, an expression of a low level of morality indicating 
that the child knows the moral code but feels the motives to follow it are external 
constraints (i.e., being punished; these justifications may be seen as revealing an 
heteronomous morality, in Piagetian terms, or an orientation of stage 1 in terms of 
Kohlberg’s stages). 
Normative justifications are more sophisticated than self-cost justifications.  They 
indicate that children know the moral code and understand the situation as a moral one 
as in the self cost justifications.  However, in contrast to the self-cost justifications, 
normative justifications are rule oriented.  That is, the reason for following the moral 
code is not being afraid of being punished, instead it is a personal commitment to the 
moral code. Although there is a personal commitment to the moral code, the child, in 
giving these justifications does not show an understanding of the reason for that moral 
code (i.e., considerations of justice and others’ welfare).  The child accepts and follows a 
set of moral norms that are defined by external authorities (like self cost justifications, 
normative justifications may be seen as a manifestation of a heteronomous moral 
orientation, in Piagetian terms).  Normative justifications like self cost justifications do not 
show an understanding and coordination of conflicting perspectives.  Justifications 
based on other cost are the most morally sophisticated ones considered in this study.  
They indicate that children understand the situation as a moral one, and are able to 
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consider conflicting perspectives and solve the moral conflict based on considerations of 
a person’s rights and welfare.  The child understands the reasons that the moral norms 
are based on and analyzes the situations in accordance with those reasons rather than 
in accordance with the norm itself.  For these reasons, self gain justifications were 
credited with 0 points, self cost were credited with 1 point, normative were credited with 
2 points, and other cost were credited with 3 points.  Scores for justifications ranged 
from 0 to 3 with higher scores indicating more sophisticated moral justifications.  
Previous studies have coded justifications in a similar way (Gasser & Keller, 2009; Malti 
et al., 2007, 2009). Twenty-five percent of all responses were coded by a second rater.  
The inter-rater reliability was κ =.87.  Disagreements were discussed and the consensus 
solution coded.  
2.4.3. Interpretive Understanding of Mind 
Following Carpendale and Chandler’s (1996) procedure, children’s answers to 
explanation questions were coded as failing, and attributed 0 points, if they wrongly 
stated that it is was not possible for the two puppets to give different interpretations of 
the situation, stating that one of them was wrong, or if they considered it possible that 
each puppet can have her own interpretation but could not justify this judgment or 
justified it purely in terms of internal individual differences without noting the ambiguous 
nature of the stimulus (e.g., “Because they are different and each one can think different 
things”). 
Children’s answers were scored as passing, and credited with 1 point, if they 
judged both interpretations to be legitimate and justified this based on the ambiguous 
nature of the situation (e.g., “Because you said it’s under the red block and there are two 
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red blocks, a bigger one and a smaller one” or “Because you didn’t say what kind of ring 
you mean” or “Because it looks like both of those things, a rabbit and a duck”). 
In response to the prediction questions, children were credited with 0 points if 
they made a clear prediction about what another person would say in the situation, or if 
they did not make a prediction but could not justify why it would be impossible to do so.  
One point was credited when children refused to make a prediction and explained why it 
would be difficult to do so (e.g., “I don’t know, it can be a duck or a rabbit”, or “I don’t 
know what he is going to see first”).  All children said the deviant interpretations did not 
make sense, so the answers to the questions about deviant interpretation were not 
considered in the final coding.  A score, ranging from 0 to 2, in each of the ambiguous 
situations was obtained by summing the points obtained by each child in the explanation 
and prediction questions.  The three tasks were significantly correlated (r = .55, p = .000 
for correlation between lexical and referential ambiguity, r = .33, p = .000, for correlation 
between lexical ambiguity and ambiguous figures, and r = .44, p = .000 for correlation 
between referential ambiguity and ambiguous figures) and a final score for interpretation, 
ranging from 0 to 6, was calculated summing the three scores obtained across the three 
situations.  Twenty-five percent of all responses were coded by a second rater and the 
inter-rater reliability was κ = .91. 
2.4.4. Mixed Emotions Understanding 
Drawing on previous research (Harter & Buddin, 1987), children’s answers to the 
mixed emotion stories were credited with 0 points, when children were not able to 
provide any emotion in response to the story; 1 point, when only one emotion was 
detected and explained across all probing; 2 points, when the child spontaneously 
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detected and explained one emotion, and explained a second emotion, introduced by 
the experimenter (i.e., Jason felt excited and scared.  Why did Jason feel excited and 
scared riding the two wheel bicycle for the first time?); 3 points, when an emotion was 
detected and explained and a second one was also detected and explained after the 
experimenter asked if there were other emotions that the child could also feel (i.e., Is 
there anything else that Jason might feel at the same time?  Why?); and 4 points, when 
the child spontaneously detected and explained two opposite emotions.  Scores of the 
two tasks were significantly correlated (r = .53, p = .000) and a final score, ranging from 
0 to 4, was calculated averaging the scores across the two stories, ranging from 0 to 4. 
Twenty-five percent of all responses were coded by a second rater and the inter-rater 
reliability was κ = .94. 
2.4.5. Parental Styles 
Drawing from Ruffman and collaborators’ coding system (Ruffman et al., 1999) 
parents’ response to each of the six disciplinary situations was credited with 0 or 1 point. 
If parents explained and explored the situation in some way without referring to the 
victim’s feelings it was credited 0 points.  The following types of answers were credited 
with 0 points: stating that the described situation is wrong and shouldn’t happen because 
it shows bad behavior, without any reference to the victim’s feelings; answers indicating 
that the child was punished; and answers that were not clear enough regarding the way 
parents did or would deal with the situation.  Answers in which parents reported 
encouraging their child to reflect on the emotional perspective of the victim of the child’s 
transgression were credited with 1 point.  Scores were summed across the six 
disciplinary situations, so the total scores ranged from 0 to 6.  
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2.4.6. Children’s Behavior 
Parents’ ratings could vary between 0 to 15 points for each one of the two 
subscales, Conduct Problems Scale and Prosocial Scale, on the Strength and 
Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman, 1997), resulting in a total score ranging from 
0 to 30.  Item scores of the Conduct Problems Scale were reversed so that higher 
scores in this scale indicate lower levels of conduct problems.  In the Prosocial Scale 
higher scores indicate higher level of prosocial behavior.  In the total scale higher scores 
indicate higher levels of prosocial behavior and less aggressive behavior.  From the 144 
parents, 107 (74.3%) returned the questionnaires (17, 29, 29, 32 in kindergarten, grade 
1, grade 2, and grade 3, respectively).  Cronbach’s α was .40 and .58 for the Conduct 
Problems Scale and the Prosocial scale, respectively, and .22 for the whole scale.  
Cronbach’s α for the parents’ questionnaires indicate that this measure lacks reliability.  
For this reason analyses with this variable were not performed. 
Teachers’ ratings could vary between 0 to 30 in the General level of aggression 
subscale, and between 0 to 15 in both Reactive aggression and Proactive aggression 
subscales of the Aggressive Scale Teacher Rating (Dodge & Coie, 1987).  The total 
score can vary from 0 to 60, with a higher value indicating lower levels of aggressive 
behavior.  Teachers’ ratings were obtained for 122 out of the total of 144 children 
(84.7%).  Cronbach’s α were .87 for reactive aggression, .93 for general aggression, and 
.92 for proactive aggression, and .95 for the whole scale. 
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Chapter 3.  
 
Results 
In the first section of the results I report how children attribute emotions in the 
various versions of the happy victimizer task across age groups.  In the second section, I 
report whether children’s moral justifications reflect different moral orientations, as well 
whether justifications vary across the various versions of the happy victimizer task.  In 
the third section, I analyze whether children’s social understanding and their social 
history are related to their emotion attributions and justifications.  Finally, in the fourth 
section, I examine the relations between children’s moral behavior and their attribution of 
emotions and justifications across story conditions. Preliminary analysis revealed no 
gender differences for the hypotheses examined in study, thus this variable is not 
considered in further analyses. 
3.1. Attribution of Emotions 
The first goal of this study was to replicate the decrease of the attribution of 
positive emotions in the standard version of the task when children attribute emotions to 
themselves in a controlled procedure and when attributions are probed.  The second 
goal was to investigate how children attribute emotions in the anticipated emotions 
version of the task, namely: whether there is a developmental change from the 
attribution of positive to the attribution of negative emotions when children attribute 
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emotions to a hypothetical victimizer; whether children attribute less or persist less in 
attributing positive emotions when they attribute emotions to themselves as if they were 
the victimizer compared to when they attribute emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in 
the anticipated emotions version; and whether children differ in the way they attribute 
emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in the standard compared to the anticipated 
emotions versions of the task. 
In the total sample, 66.6% of the children gave answers that were credited with 2 
points (the reluctant happy victimizers, as 2 points were credited when children 
attributed negative emotions, but also attributed positive ones, across probing, mixed 
emotions right away, or when children attributed negative emotions, never changing to 
positive ones across probing questions).  Following this, 19.7% of the children’s answers 
were credited with 1 point (1 point was credited when children first attributed a positive 
emotion but in response to probing questions also stated that the victimizer would feel 
negative emotions).  Finally, 12.7% of the attributions were credited with 0 points (the 
“hard core” happy victimizers, as 0 points were credited when children attributed positive 
emotions and kept doing so across probing questions).  In the kindergarten group, 
59.3% of the answers were credited with 2 points, 18.8% were credited with 1 point, and 
21.9% were credited with 0 points.  In grade 1, 56.6% of the answers were credited with 
2 points, 27.8% were credited with 1 point, and 15.6% were credited with 0 points.  In 
grade 2, 74.1% of the answers were credited with 2 points, 19.1% were credited with 1 
point, and 6.9% were credited with 0 points.  In grade 3, 80.6% of the answers were 
credited with 2 points, 13.2% were credited with 1 point, and 6.2% were credited with 0 
points. 
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Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of children’s emotion 
attributions for each one of the story conditions in the study, Task version (standard and 
anticipated emotions), Person (self/other), and Action (stealing and pushing) by Age 
group.  In the present study, younger children had the lowest mean for emotion 
attributions in the standard version (M = 1.35).  The older the children the higher the 
mean for emotion attributions in the standard version of the task (M = 1.40, for 6-year-
olds; M = 1.65, for 7-year-olds; M = 1.71, for 8-year-olds), replicating the finding of the 
happy victimizer phenomenon. This is, younger children tend to attribute more positive 
emotions or persist more in attributing positive emotions to a hypothetical victimizer than 
older children. 
A 4 (School grade) x 2 (Gender) x 2 (Person: self/other) x 2 (Action: 
stealing/pushing) x 2 (Task version: standard/anticipated emotions), ANOVA with 
Person, Action, and Task version as repeated measures, and School grade and Gender 
as between-subjects factors was performed.  Results showed a main effect for School 
grade, F(3,144) = 6.13, p < .001, ηp² = .13, indicating that children from different grades 
persist differently in the happy victimizer pattern of attributions.  Post-hoc analysis 
revealed that children from kindergarten and grade 1 did not differ from each other in the 
way they attributed emotions (p = n.s., Ms = 1.37, 1.41, SDs = .51, .52, for kindergarten 
and grade 1) and children from grade 2 and grade 3 also did not differ from each other 
(p = n.s., Ms = 1.67, 1.74; SDs = .29, .32, for grade 2 and grade 3). However, the 
kindergarten group differed from the grade 2 (p < .05) and grade 3 groups (p < .01) in 
the way they attributed emotions to the victimizer, with kindergarten children persisting in 
attributing positive emotions to the victimizer more than children from grade 2 and grade 
3.  Grade 1 children also differed from grade 2 (p <.05) and grade 3 (p <.01) with 
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younger children persisting more in attributing positive emotions to the victimizer.  These 
results indicate that there is a developmental trend in the way children attribute emotions 
to victimizers.  More specifically, kindergarten and grade 1 children attribute more or 
persist more in attributing positive emotions to victimizers than children from grades 2 
and 3.  These results indicate a replication of the happy victimizer phenomenon, but they 
are contrary to the expectation that there would be no developmental trend from the 
attribution of positive to the attribution of negative emotions when children attribute 
emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in the anticipated emotions version of the task. 
Table 1. Means (SDs) of Children’s Emotion Attributions for Each One of the 
Conditions by Age Group 
 Age groups 
 5-year-olds 6-year-olds 7-year-olds 8-year-olds Total 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Standard 1.35 (0.59) 1.40 (0.60) 1.65 (0.36) 1.71 (0.43) 1.53 (0.52) 
Ant. emotions 1.40 (0.57) 1.42 (0.57) 1.69 (0.33) 1.78 (0.36) 1.57 (0.49) 
Self 1.40 (0.57) 1.51 (0.58) 1.84 (0.28) 1.85 (0.25) 1.65 (0.48) 
Other 1.34 (0.57) 1.31 (0.54) 1.50 (0.44) 1.64 (0.45) 1.45 (0.51) 
Stealing 1.36 (0.59) 1.32 (0.57) 1.58 (0.37) 1.68 (0.41) 1.48 (0.51) 
Pushing 1.38 (0.57) 1.50 (0.56) 1.76 (0.33) 1.81 (0.31) 1.61 (0.49) 
Total 0.80 (0.45) 0.92 (0.56) 1.10(0.30) 1.20 (0.32) 1.55 (0.45) 
Note. Means could vary from 0 to 2.  For each age group, n=36. For the total group, n=144.  
There was also a main effect for Person, F(1,35) = 33.49, p < .001, ηp² = .20 (Ms 
= 1.65, 1.45, SDs = .48, .51, for attributions to the self as the victimizer and for a 
hypothetical victimizer, respectively), indicating that children attributed less positive 
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emotions or persisted less in attributing positive emotions to themselves compared to a 
hypothetical victimizer.  That is, children were less likely to attribute negative emotions to 
the hypothetical victimizer than to themselves as if they were the victimizer.  However, 
this main effect was qualified by a Person x School grade interaction, F (3,135) = 2.75, p 
<.05, ηp² = .06, and a Person x Task version interaction, F(1,135) = 5.18, p <.05, ηp² = 
.04.  Simple effect analysis revealed (Bonferroni correction considered) that differences 
were significant in grade 1, t(35) = 3.04, p <.01, Cohen’s d = .36   (Ms = 1.51, 1.31, SDs 
= .58, .54, for Self and Other conditions, respectively), grade 2, t(35) = 4.64, p = .000, 
Cohen’s d = .92 (Ms = 1.84, 1.50, SDs = .28, .44), and grade 3, t(35) = 3.51, p <.05, 
Cohen’s d = .58 (Ms = 1.85, 1.64, SDs = .25, .45), indicating that older children were 
significantly less likely to attribute emotions following the happy victimizer pattern when 
they attribute emotions to themselves compared to when they attributed emotions to a 
hypothetical victimizer. This tendency was not observed in children in kindergarten (t(35) 
= .85, p = n.s., Ms = 1.40, 1.34, SDs = .56, .57), who made the same kind of attributions 
in both self and other conditions.  These results are, partially, in accordance with the 
hypotheses of this study, according to which I expected to replicate the finding of a 
decrease in the happy victimizer pattern when children attribute emotions to themselves 
if they were the victimizers, in a controlled procedure and when emotion attributions 
were probed, compared to when children attribute emotions to a hypothetical victimizer, 
in the standard but not in the anticipated emotions versions of the task.  The decrease of 
the happy victimizer pattern was observed in both versions of the task, in the three older 
groups but not in the 5-year-olds.  
Simple effect analysis for the Person x Task Version interaction revealed a 
significant difference (Bonferroni correction considered) for attributions in the Other 
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condition, t(143) = -2.19, p < .05, Cohen’s d = -.20 (Ms = 1.39, 1.51, SDs = .62, .59, for 
the standard and anticipated emotions versions of the task), but not in the Self condition, 
t(143) = .54, p = n.s., Cohen’s d = .04  (Ms = 1.66, 1.64, SDs = .55, .54), indicating that 
children attributed more emotions according to the happy victimizer pattern when they 
attribute emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in the standard than in the anticipated 
emotions version of the task. This difference was not observed between the two versions 
of the task when children attributed emotions to themselves as the victimizer.  These 
results are in line with my hypotheses, according to which children were expected to 
differ in the way they attribute emotions to a hypothetical victimizer, but not to 
themselves as if they were the victimizer, in the standard compared to the anticipated 
emotions versions of the task.  Children attributed less or persisted less in attributing 
positive emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in the anticipated emotions version than in 
the standard version of the task.  They did not differ in the way they attributed emotions 
to themselves as if they were the victimizer when comparing emotions attributions in the 
standard and anticipated emotions versions. 
There was also a main effect for Action, F(1,135) = 12.47, p <.001, ηp² = .09 (Ms 
= 1.48, 1.61, SDs = .51, .49, for stealing versus pushing), indicating that children 
attribute more emotions according to the happy victimizer pattern in the stealing than in 
the pushing story.  No main effects were observed for Task version, F(1,135) = 1.28, p = 
n.s., ηp² = .09 (Ms = 1.53, 1.57, SDs = .52, .49, for standard and anticipated emotions 
versions of the tasks), and Gender, F(1,135) = .338, p = n.s., ηp² = .02  (Ms = 1.56, 1.57, 
SDs = .48, .42, for boys and girls, respectively). 
In sum, the analyses of children’s emotion attributions showed (a) a 
developmental change from the attribution of positive emotions to the attribution of 
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negative emotions when both versions of the task were considered; (b) an increase in 
the attribution of positive emotions to a hypothetical victimizer compared to the self in all 
age groups except in kindergarten, in both versions of the task; (c) children were less 
prone to attribute positive emotions or persisted less in attributing positive emotions to a 
hypothetical victimizer in the anticipated emotions than in the standard version of the 
happy victimizer task; (d) there were no differences between the way children attributed 
emotions to themselves as the victimizer in the standard and anticipated emotions 
versions of the task. These results indicate that children attribute emotions differently in 
the standard and modified emotions version of the task when they attribute emotions to 
a hypothetical victimizer, but not to themselves as if they were the victimizer.  Finally, 
children differ significantly in the way they attributed emotions in the pushing and 
stealing story, attributing emotions more in accordance with the happy victimizer pattern 
in the stealing than in the pushing story. 
3.2. Justifications 
The third goal of this study was to investigate whether children give justifications 
based on concern for others, when justifications are probed, and to investigate whether 
children give different justifications in the standard and anticipated emotions version of 
the task.  
Table 2 shows the percentage of the different types of justifications given by 
children for the whole sample and in each age group, indicating that although other cost 
justifications are not the most frequently given justifications, 30.3% of the total of 
justifications were based on concerns for victims’ cost.  Also, in all age groups at least 
23% of the justifications were based on concerns for the victim.  These results are in line 
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with what I expected, according to which moral justifications could be related to different 
moral orientations, more rule oriented or based on concerns for the welfare and rights of 
the victim. 
Table 2. Percentages of Different Types of Justifications by Age Group 
  Justifications 
School grade Self gain Self cost Normative Other cost 
kindergarten 22.0% 42.9% 33.8% 23.3% 
Grade 1 15.6% 25.0% 26.7% 32.6% 
Grade 2 6.9% 12.2% 52.1% 28.8% 
Grade 3 6.2% 8.7% 48.6% 36.5% 
Total 12.7% 16.7% 40.3% 30.3% 
To analyze whether children gave different justifications in the standard version 
compared to the anticipated emotions version of the task when they attributed emotions 
to a hypothetical victimizer and when they attributed emotions to themselves as the 
victimizer, Wilcoxon signed rank tests were run.  Separate analyses comparing the way 
children attributed emotions in the stealing and pushing stories were run because 
justifications in the pushing and stealing stories were only weakly and moderately 
correlated within self and other attribution, in the standard and in the anticipated 
emotions versions of the task (rs = .23, p < .01, for self attributions in the standard task; 
rs = .21, p < .05, for other attributions in the standard task, rs = .25, p < .01, for self 
attributions in the anticipated emotions task; and rs = .40, p < .001, for attributions to a 
hypothetical victimizer in the anticipated emotions task).  
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Wilcoxon tests showed that in the pushing story across the whole sample, 
children gave less sophisticated moral justifications for a hypothetical victimizer in the 
standard than in the anticipated emotions version of the task (Wilcoxon Z = 2.39, p = 
.017).  These differences were not observed when children attributed emotions to a 
hypothetical victimizer in the stealing story (Wilcoxon Z = -.68, p = n.s.), nor when 
separate analyses were run within each age group (Wilcoxon Z = -.04, p = n.s., for 
kindergarten, Wilcoxon Z = -.34, p = n.s., for grade 1, Wilcoxon Z = -.29, p = n.s., for 
grade 2, and Wilcoxon Z = -.29, p = n.s., for grade 3, for pushing story; Wilcoxon Z = -
1.66, p = n.s., for kindergarten, Wilcoxon Z = -.67, p = n.s., for grade 1, Wilcoxon Z = -
.54, p = .n.s., for grade 2, and Wilcoxon Z = -1.10, p = n.s., for grade 3, for stealing 
story).  
Analyses of children’s justifications for the emotions they attributed to themselves 
as the victimizer showed that when the whole sample was considered children did not 
give different justifications between the standard and anticipated emotions versions of 
the task, in both stealing (Wilcoxon Z = -.48, p = n.s.) and pushing stories (Wilcoxon Z = 
-1.8, p = n.s.).  Analyses performed by age group showed that children from 
kindergarten and grade 1 gave different justifications in the standard and anticipated 
emotions version of the stealing story (Wilcoxon Z = -2.62, p < .01, for kindergarten and 
Wilcoxon Z = -2.16, p < .05, for grade 1).  However, these differences are not similar.  
Kindergarten children gave more sophisticated moral justifications in the standard than 
in the anticipated emotions version of the task.  Grade 1 children gave more 
sophisticated justifications in the anticipated emotions version.  Children from grade 3 
also gave different justifications between the standard and anticipated emotions in the 
pushing story (Wilcoxon Z = -2.13, p < .05).  In this case more sophisticated moral 
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justifications were given in the standard not in the anticipated emotions version of the 
task.  No other significant differences were found when comparisons regarding the way 
children attribute emotions to themselves between the standard and anticipated versions 
of the task were made within each age group (Wilcoxon Z = -1.16, p = n.s., for 
kindergarten, Wilcoxon Z = .67, p = n.s., for grade 1, Wilcoxon Z = -1.31, p = n.s., for 
grade 2, for the pushing story; Wilcoxon Z = -.595, p = n.s., for grade 2, and Wilcoxon Z 
= -.40 p = n.s., for grade 3, in the stealing story).  
In sum, the analysis of justifications showed that when justifications are probed, 
children as young as 5 years of age gave justifications based on concerns for the 
victim’s welfare and rights.  These results show that moral justifications were related to 
two distinct moral orientations, one, rule oriented, and another based on concerns for the 
well being and rights of the victim.  Regarding the way children justified their emotion 
attributions, comparing justifications in the standard and anticipated emotions versions of 
the task, children differed in the way they justified their emotion attributions in very few 
cases.  When children attributed emotions to a hypothetical victimizer these differences 
were only observed in the pushing story, when the whole sample was considered.  
When children attributed emotions to themselves as if they were the victimizer there 
were differences in kindergarten and grade 1 group in the stealing story and in grade 3 
in the pushing story.  No other differences were observed when comparing justifications 
between the standard and anticipated emotion versions of the task.  
3.3. Attribution of Emotions and Social Understanding 
The fourth and fifth goals of the present study were to investigate whether there 
was a relationship between children’s attribution of emotions and social understanding 
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(assessed by children’s understanding of interpretation and mixed emotions) and 
between children’s attribution of emotions and their social history (assessed with 
parents’ ways of talking about disciplinary situations and number of siblings). 
Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for children’s understanding of 
interpretation and mixed emotions, as well as the means and standard deviations of 
children’s number of siblings and the way parents talk with their child about disciplinary 
situations.  To test whether children’s attribution of emotions were related to their 
understanding of interpretation, correlations were run between children’s attribution of 
emotions and their understanding of interpretation, for each one of the eight story 
conditions (self/other x pushing/stealing x standard/anticipated).  As children’s 
understanding of interpretation was correlated with their age (r = .47 p < .001), partial 
correlations, controlling for age, were run.  Contrary to what was expected, correlations 
between children’s attributions of emotions and their understanding of interpretation 
were low and non-significant (correlations ranged from -.07 to .12) in each one of the 
eight story conditions. 
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Table 3. Means (SD) of Interpretive Understanding, Mixed Emotions, Number 
of Siblings and Parents’ Style by Age Group 
 
Age group 
5-year-olds 6-year-olds 7-year-olds 8-year-olds Total 
 
n   
Mean (SD)  
Range 
n   
Mean (SD)  
Range 
n   
Mean (SD)  
Range 
n   
Mean (SD)  
Range 
n   
Mean (SD)  
Range 
Interpretation 
36    
.72 (0.74)    
0-6 
36    
1.75 (1.50)    
0-6 
36    
2.61 (2.02)    
0-6 
36    
3.22 (1.88)   
0-6 
144  
 2.08 (1.86)  
 0-6 
Mixed 
emotions 
36     
1.53 (0.55)  
0-4 
36    
2.31 (0.61)    
0-4 
36    
2.54 (0.51)    
0-4 
36    
2.76 (0.65)   
0-4 
144   
2.28 (0.74)   
0-4 
Total siblings 
17     
1.45 (1.03)     
- 
29     
1.21 (0.73)      
- 
29    
1.34 (1.08)      
- 
32    
1.29 (0.59)      
- 
107    
1.33 (0.9)     
 - 
Older siblings 
17    
 0.77 (1.09)     
- 
29     
0.62 (0.73)     
 - 
29     
0.76 (1.15)      
- 
32 
    0.76 (0.75)     
- 
107    
0.73 (0.96)    
- 
Disciplinary 
situations 
17    
0.76 (0.90)   
0-6 
29    
0.55 (0.83)  
0-6 
29    
0.55 (0.87)    
0-6 
32    
0.69 (0.93)    
0-6 
107    
0.62 (0.87)  
0-6 
To test whether children’s justifications were related to their understanding of 
interpretation, a new dichotomous variable, based on children’s justifications, was 
created.  Self gain, self cost, and normative justifications were credited with 0 points, as 
they do not involve perspective taking.  Other cost justifications were credited with 1 
point, as they involve perspective taking, by explicitly referring to concern for the victim’s 
harm or loss.  Spearman’s correlations were run separately within each age group (as 
children’s understanding of interpretation was correlated with children’s age) for each 
one of the eight story attribution conditions (self/other x pushing/stealing x 
standard/anticipated).  Contrary to expectations, the analyzed correlations showed 
values between -.14 and .37 and all but one did not reach statistic significance. The 
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significant correlation was observed in grade 2, when children attributed emotions to 
themselves as the victimizer, in the standard version of the pushing story (rs = .37, p < 
.05).  Children’s justifications of their emotion attributions to a hypothetical victimizer in 
the standard version of the task and their understanding of interpretation were not 
correlated (rs = .07, n.s.). 
To test whether children’s attributions of emotions were correlated with their 
understanding of mixed emotions, correlations were run between these two variables for 
each one of the 8 story conditions.  As understanding of mixed emotions were correlated 
with age (r = .60, p < .001), partial correlations were run controlling for age.  All of the 8 
calculated correlations were low and non-significant (correlations ranged from -.09 to 
.22).  These results are contrary to what was expected.  
Because in the previous analyzed variable for emotion attributions the higher 
scores involved children who attributed negative emotions without changing across 
probing, a new ordinal variable based on children’s tendency to attribute mixed emotions 
was created to analyze the relationship between children’s attribution of emotions and 
their understanding of mixed emotions.  In this new variable, attributions of positive or 
negative emotions without changing across probing questions were credited with 0 
points.  Attributions of mixed emotions across probing were credited with 1 point.  
Attributions of mixed emotions right away (11.5% of the total of the attributions) were 
credit with 2 points.  As understanding of mixed emotions was correlated with children’s 
age, Spearman correlations were run within each age group.  Contrary to expectations, 
all correlations, except two, ranged from rs = -.22 to rs = .3 and were non-significant.  
Two significant correlations were found in grade 2, when children attributed emotions to 
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themselves as the victimizer in the anticipated emotions version of the task of the 
pushing (rs = .42, p < .05) and stealing (rs = .38, p < .05) stories.  
In sum, regarding the relation between children’s attribution of emotions and their 
understanding of interpretation, contrary to what was expected, no correlations between 
these two variables were observed.  Also, in contrast to what was anticipated, children’s 
justifications were not correlated with children’s understanding of interpretation when 
children attributed emotions to themselves in both versions of the task and when they 
attributed emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in the anticipated emotions version of the 
task.  Regarding children’s attribution of emotions and their understanding of mixed 
emotions, again, in contrast to what was expected, there were no significant correlations 
between these two variables within any of the 8 story conditions.  Supplementary 
analyses, testing the correlation between children’s attribution of emotions and their 
understanding of mixed emotions, using a variable measuring how prone children were 
to attribute mixed emotions, showed that these two variables were only correlated in 
grade 2 when children attributed emotions to themselves as if they were the victimizer in 
both stealing and pushing story.  However, these two correlations were contrary to what 
was expected.  
3.4. Attribution of Emotions and Children’s Social History 
The fifth goal of this study was to investigate whether there is a relationship 
between children’s attribution of emotions and justifications in victimization situations 
and their social history assessed with parents’ ways of talking about disciplinary 
situations and the number of siblings the children have.  To determine if there was a 
positive relation between the way parents talk about disciplinary situations and children’s 
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attribution of emotions, correlations between these two variables were calculated within 
each one of the 8 stories.  As children’s attribution of emotions was significantly 
correlated with age in all story conditions (except in the stealing story, when children 
attributed emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in the anticipated emotions version of the 
task), partial correlations for emotion attributions were run.  Contrarily to what was 
expected results showed that there were no significant correlations between the way 
parents talk about disciplinary situations and children’s attributions of emotions in any 
version of the task (correlations ranged from -.06 to .18 and did not reach statistical 
significance). 
Regarding the relation between children’s justifications and the way parents talk 
about disciplinary situations, analyses were run to test if children’s justifications were 
correlated with age.  Children’s justifications were correlated with age when children 
attributed emotions to themselves as the victimizer in all of the conditions (rs = .23, p < 
.01; rs = .29, p < .001, for stealing stories, in the standard and anticipated emotions 
versions of the task; rs = .34, p < .001; rs = .24, p < .01, for pushing stories, in the 
standard and anticipated emotions versions of the task).  When children attributed 
emotions to a hypothetical victimizer, justifications were only correlated with age in the 
standard version of the stealing story (rs = .17, p < .05).  Justifications were not 
correlated with age in any of the other story conditions when children attributed emotions 
to a hypothetical victimizer (rs = .05, p = n.s., for the standard version of the pushing 
story, and rs = .16, p = n.s. and rs = .11, p = n.s., for the anticipated emotions version of 
the stealing and pushing stories).  Correlations were run separately within each age 
group in the stories where justifications were correlated with age.  Contrary to 
expectations, the way parents talk about disciplinary situations was not correlated to 
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children’s justifications when they attributed emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in the 
standard version of the task (correlations ranged from -.0 to .12 and did not reach 
statistical significance), nor when children attributed emotions to themselves as if they 
were the victimizer in both the standard and anticipated emotions version of the task, 
and when they attributed emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in the anticipated 
emotions version of the task (correlations ranged from 03 to .32 and did not reach 
statistical significance). 
The number of siblings the children had ranged from 0 to 5. Eleven children had 
0 siblings, 64 had 1 sibling, 22 had 2 siblings, 8 had 3 siblings, and 2 children had 5 
siblings. Considering only older siblings, 53 had no older siblings, 38 had 1 older sibling, 
12 had 2 older siblings, 2 had 3 older siblings, and 2 had 5 older siblings. Parents of 38 
children did not return the questionnaires so it was not possible to know the number of 
siblings these children had. 
To analyze whether there was a positive relation between the number of siblings 
children had (considering older siblings only, or any siblings) and children’s attribution of 
emotions, partial correlations, controlling for age, were run for each one of the 8 stories.  
Contrary to expectations, correlations ranged from -.03 to .22 and were not statistically 
significant.  
Finally, to investigate whether there was a relation between children’s 
justifications and their number of siblings, Spearman’s correlations were run.  
Correlations were run separately within each age group in the stories where justifications 
were correlated with age.  Among all of the calculated correlations, only two were 
statistically significant, namely, for grade 2 and grade 3 children’s attribution of emotions 
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to themselves in the standard version of the task, in the pushing story (rs = - .47, p < .05, 
rs = -.38, p < .05 for grade 2 and grade3).  All of the other correlations ranged from -.01 
to .22 and were non-significant.  Although significant, these correlations are contrary to 
what was expected.  I expected positive correlations between children’s justifications 
and their number of siblings when they attributed emotions to themselves as if they were 
the victimizers and when they attributed emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in the 
anticipated emotions version of the task.  There were only two situations where 
correlations were found.  However, they were negative not positive correlations, contrary 
to my prediction.  Contrarily to what was expected, no correlations were found between 
children’s justifications and their number of siblings when they attributed emotions to a 
victimizer in the standard version of the task. 
In sum, in contrast to what was anticipated, children’s attributions of emotions 
and justifications were overall not related with children’s social history, namely with the 
way parents talk with them about disciplinary situations and with children’s number of 
siblings.  There were two situations in which children’s justifications and children’s 
number of siblings were significantly correlated.  However, although moderate, those 
were negative correlations, and so, contrary to what were expected.  
3.5. Attribution of Emotions and Children’s Behavior 
The last goal of this study was to investigate if the attribution of emotions to a 
hypothetical victimizer in the anticipated version of the task, was related to children’s 
social behavior and if children’s attribution of emotions to a hypothetical victimizer, in the 
anticipated emotions version of the task could account for more explained variability of 
children’s moral behavior than children’s attribution of emotions in the other versions of 
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the task (i.e., self attributions in the standard and anticipated version of the task and 
attributions to a hypothetical victimizer in the standard version of the task).  
Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations for behavior scores from 
teachers’ ratings, by age group.  Table 5 shows the correlations between teachers’ 
measures of behavior and the children’s attributions of emotions.  Partial correlations 
controlling for age between children’s attribution of emotions in each one of the stories 
and children’s behavior were run.  Correlations ranged from -.19 to .18 and were not 
statistically significant.  Spearman correlations were run between children’s justifications 
and children’s behavior within each age group.  All correlations ranged from -.11 to .17 
and were non significant. 
In sum, no significant correlations were found between children’s behavior and 
children’s emotion attributions and justifications.  These results are contrary to what was 
predicted.  It was expected that children’s attribution of emotions to a hypothetical 
victimizer in the anticipated emotions version of the task would be a stronger predictor of 
their moral behavior than their attribution of emotions to themselves as if they were the 
victimizer in any version of the task or than their attribution of emotions to a hypothetical 
victimizer in the standard version.  In this study, children’s attributions of emotions and 
justifications in those stories conditions were not significantly correlated with children’s 
behavior. 
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Table 4. Means (SDs) of Teachers’ Ratings of Behavior by Age Group 
 Age group 
 5-year-olds 6-year-olds 7-year-olds 8-year-olds Total 
 
n 
Mean (SD) 
n 
Mean (SD) 
n 
Mean (SD) 
n 
Mean (SD) 
n 
Mean (SD) 
Behavior (total 
score) 
36 
3.20 (0.72) 
28  
2.75 (1.25) 
23 
3.33 (0.65) 
36  
2.97 (0.94) 
123 
3.08 (0.91) 
Reactive 
aggression  
36 
2.83 (0.85) 
28 
2.26 (1.31) 
23 
2.89 (0.75) 
36 
2.59 (1.13) 
123 
2.66 (1.03) 
General 
aggression 
36 
3.21 (0.73) 
28 
2.79 (1.36) 
23 
3.39 (0.73) 
36  
2.98 (0.95) 
123  
3.10 (0.96) 
Proactive 
aggression 
36 
3.53 (0.71) 
28 
3.16 (1.29) 
23 
3.67 (0.66) 
36 
3.33 (1.05) 
123 
3.44 (0.93) 
Note. Means could vary from 0 to 5. 
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Table 5. Partial Correlations Between Children’s Emotion Attributions and 
Children’s Behavior 
 Behavior 
 Behavior  (total score) 
Reactive  
aggression 
General  
aggression 
Proactive  
aggression 
Std Other Steal .05 .00 .06 .07 
Std Other Push .01 -.04 .03 .03 
Ant Other Steal .04 .02 .05 .04 
Ant Other Push -.08 -.15 .06 -.01 
     
Std Self Steal -.12 -.19 -.10 -.06 
Std Self Push .15 .07 .16 .18 
Ant Self Steal .25 -.01 -.01 -.14 
Ant Self Push -.28 -.04 -.02 -.02 
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Chapter 4.  
 
Discussion 
The present study aimed to: (a) replicate the finding of a decrease in attribution of 
positive emotions when children attribute emotions to themselves as the victimizer 
compared to a hypothetical victimizer, in a methodologically controlled procedure, and 
with probing children’s attributions; (b) investigate how children attribute emotions in the 
anticipated emotions version of the happy victimizer task and how these emotion 
attributions differ from attributions in the standard version of the task; (c) investigate 
whether different moral orientations underlie moral justifications, and whether children 
give different kinds of justifications in the standard compared to the anticipated emotions 
version of the task; (d) investigate whether children’s attribution of emotions and 
justifications are related to their understanding of interpretation and mixed emotions; (e) 
investigate whether there is a relationship between the children’s emotion attributions 
and justifications and the way their parents talk about disciplinary situations and 
children’s number of siblings; and (f) investigate whether children’s behavior is more 
strongly related to children’s attribution of emotions in the anticipated emotions than in 
the standard version of the happy victimizer task. 
In the present study, children attributed emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in 
the standard version of the task following the same pattern of emotion attributions 
observed in previous studies.  Five- and 6-year-old children attributed more positive 
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emotions to the victimizer than 7- and 8-year-old children (e.g., Malti & Keller, 2009; 
Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988).  Therefore, this is a cross-linguistic and cross-cultural 
replication of the happy victimizer phenomenon in a Portuguese population that is also 
consistent with previous research on the happy victimizer phenomenon in Portugal 
(Keller et al., 2003; Lourenço, 1997). 
Concerning children’s attribution of emotions to themselves as the victimizer and 
to a hypothetical victimizer, in the present study, 6-, 7-, and 8-year-old, but not 5-year-
old children, attributed less positive emotions when they attributed emotions to 
themselves as the victimizer compared to attributing emotions to a hypothetical 
victimizer.  These results partially replicate previous research and extend earlier findings 
by showing a developmental change in the way children differentiate attribution of 
emotions to themselves as the victimizer compared to a hypothetical victimizer.  
Previous studies have described a decrease in the attribution of positive emotions, even 
in kindergarten children (Keller et al., 2003; Malti et al., 2007; Malti & Keller, 2009), when 
they were asked to imagine themselves as the victimizer.  However, none of the 
previous studies have investigated how children attribute emotions to themselves as the 
victimizer compared to a hypothetical victimizer in a procedure controlled for order and 
with probed attributions.  These results raise questions about the strength of younger 
children’s decrease of attribution of positive emotions when children attribute emotions 
to themselves as if they were the victimizer in procedures where attributions are not 
probed (Arsenio, 2010; Nunner-Winkler, 2007; Weirsman & Laupa, 2000).  However, the 
present study is the only one that has tested children’s emotion attributions in 
victimization scenarios in a controlled and probed procedure.  More studies aiming to 
replicate this finding should be conducted. 
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The reasons why children attribute less positive emotions to themselves than to a 
hypothetical victimizer are unclear as well as the meaning of these differences for 
children’s moral development.  For example, the decrease of the attribution of positive 
emotions when children attribute emotions to themselves might be related to children’s 
growing awareness of the social meaning of feeling good after having victimized another 
child.  If this is the case, children’s self attributions might reflect children’s awareness of 
the social norms rather than their expectations regarding the emotional outcomes of 
victimization situations.  Further research should carefully investigate possible reasons 
for these differences and their meaning for children’s moral development.  
Another goal of the present study was to investigate the kind of emotions children 
attribute in the anticipated emotions version of the task, and whether children attribute 
different emotions comparing the standard and the anticipated emotion versions of the 
task.  In the present study, children’s attribution of emotions in scenarios of victimization 
revealed a developmental shift from a tendency to attribute positive emotions to 
victimizers to a tendency to attribute negative emotions.  Five- and 6-year-old children 
attributed more emotions in accordance with the happy victimizer pattern than 7- and 8-
year-olds, even when children’s attributions were probed in both versions of the task.  
These results are in accordance with previous research, which has reported a 
developmental shift around 6 to 7 years of age, from an attribution of positive to the 
attribution of negative emotions when children attribute emotions to a hypothetical 
victimizer in the standard version of the task (Barden et al., 1980; Keller et al., 2003; 
Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988).  
The results, however, also extend previous research by reporting this 
developmental shift when children attribute emotions in the anticipated emotions version 
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of the task.  Despite this observed developmental shift, children attributed less or 
persisted less in attributing positive emotions to a hypothetical victimizer in the 
anticipated emotions version of the task than in the standard version.  These results 
indicate that children differ in their emotions expectancies when they assess the 
emotional outcome of a hypothetical transgressor who had already transgressed a moral 
rule, victimizing another child in order to obtain a personal gain, as being different from 
the emotional outcome that is anticipated before the immoral action being performed.  
The reasons for these differences are also unclear.  Following my critique of the 
standard version of the happy victimizer task, one possible reason for this difference is 
that children who respond to the standard version of the task by saying that the 
victimizer would feel happy do so because they respond to the task as requiring taking 
the perspective of the victimizer rather than assessing the morality of the action.  That is, 
children may be attributing emotions to the hypothetical victimizer in the standard 
version of the task in accordance to what they consider to be the perspective of the 
victimizer (i.e., someone who feels good, otherwise the victimizer would have not 
performed the action), rather than in accordance to children’s own perspective regarding 
that situation.  
In the present study, children’s attribution of emotions was not related to their 
understanding of interpretation. However, future research should investigate what may 
explain the differences that are observed between children’s attribution of emotions to a 
hypothetical victimizer in the standard version compared to the anticipated emotions 
version of the happy victimizer task. Since the present study is the only one that has 
compared children’s emotion attributions in the standard and anticipated emotions 
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versions of the happy victimizer task more studies aiming to replicate this finding should 
be conducted.  
Although not directly related to the goals of the present study, results showed 
that children attributed more negative emotions in the story involving pushing another 
child off a swing than in the story about stealing a chocolate.  These results are in 
accordance with previous research (Keller et al., 2003; Lourenço, 1997).  Although 
previous studies have found these differences, none of them have elaborated on 
possible reasons for these differences.  Pushing another child of a swing occurs in a 
playground where there are usually other children and adults supervising, whereas 
stealing a chocolate might usually occur in a quiet hallway of the school without being 
observed.  It may be that this difference in how private or public the situation is may 
influence differences in children’s emotion attributions.  Also, the cost to the victim in the 
pushing story (i.e., physical aggression) is more salient than in the stealing situation.  
However, previous research has shown that the salience of the victim does not have an 
impact on children’s attribution of positive emotions to the victimizer (Arsenio & Kramer, 
1992).  Children’s higher proneness to attribute negative emotions in the pushing than in 
the stealing story may be more related to the context where the action happens than to 
the salience of the victim’s cost.  Studies in which these differences are investigated by 
manipulating the salience of the cost for the victim and the context where it happens 
(i.e., public or private) could provide information about the role of these aspects of the 
situations in children’s emotion attributions in victimization scenarios. 
Another goal of the present study was to investigate whether the reasons behind 
the moral justifications were mainly rule oriented or may also be due to concern for 
others’ harm and loss.  Results from the present study showed that 33% of the 
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justifications given by children were based on concern for the victim’s harm and loss, 
and children as young as 5 years old were able to give this type of justification.  This is a 
new result since previous studies, even when probing justifications procedures were 
followed, did not report finding this kind of justification (Malti et al., 2008; Malti et al., 
2009; Malti et al., 2010).  This difference between the present study and previous 
studies may be due to different probing procedures.  It is possible that probing in the 
present study was more extensive than in previous studies.  If children, as young as 5 
years old are able to give justifications based on concern for others’ harm and loss, 
considerations about children’s moral understanding drawn from children’s moral 
justifications, when justifications were not probed, should be done cautiously.  
Another goal of this study was to investigate whether children give different 
justifications in the standard and anticipated emotions version of the task.  Results show 
that when children attributed emotions to a hypothetical victimizer, they gave more 
sophisticated moral justifications in the anticipated version than in the standard version 
of the task in the pushing story.  In the stealing story children did not differ in their 
justifications comparing the standard and anticipated emotions versions of the task.  
When children attributed emotions to themselves as if they were the victimizer there 
were no differences in children’s justifications within age groups between the standard 
and anticipated emotions versions of the task, except in three cases.  These results 
highlight the fact that the moral justifications considered in previous studies may be 
based on various forms of moral orientation.  Therefore, they should be viewed 
cautiously when drawing inferences about children’s moral development.  
Another goal of the present study was to investigate how children’s 
understanding of interpretation and mixed emotions is related to children’s attributions of 
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emotions and their justification for these emotions in victimization scenarios.  Results 
showed that children’s attribution of emotions and justifications were not correlated with 
children’s understanding of interpretation and mixed emotions in any versions of the task 
investigated in the present study.  These results are in accordance with previous 
research (Malti et al., 2010), indicating that understanding of victimization scenarios 
seems to be related to other variables rather than the assessed aspects of social 
understanding.  These results suggest that understanding victimization situations and 
social understanding may not be related, at least at young ages.  However, results found 
in the present study should be carefully examined.  Children in the present study 
performed poorly in the understanding of interpretation task, so results for understanding 
of interpretation lacked variability.  The task used to assess understanding of 
interpretation (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996) might have been too demanding for the 
young participants of the present study as it requires verbal awareness of interpretation 
(children had to verbally explain why is it possible and reasonable that two people think 
differently about the same situation and say if it is possible to predict what a third 
individual will think about the ambiguous stimulus).  Other studies using alternative tasks 
that may capture more rudimentary levels of younger children’s understanding of 
interpretation could clarify this relationship. For example, Lalonde and Chandler‘s (2002) 
understanding of interpretation tasks used in previous studies (Malti et al., 2010) may be 
less demanding.  In those tasks children have to interpret the ambiguous parts of 
drawings from the perspective of two different puppets but they are only asked about 
what each one of the two puppets might think about the ambiguous drawing.  Children 
are not required to explain why it is possible for two individuals to think different things 
about the same event.   
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Results of the present study showed no relationship between children’s 
attribution of mixed emotions and children’s understanding of mixed emotions. Once 
more, children in the present study performed poorly in the understanding of mixed 
emotions task, so results for this variable lacked variability.  To my knowledge the 
present study is the only one that has investigated this relationship.  As previous studies 
have shown, 6- and 8-year-olds, but not 4-year-old children are able to attribute mixed 
emotions to victimizers (Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Lourenço, 1997).  Future studies using 
another task capable of capturing higher variability in children’s answers may investigate 
further if there is a relation between children’s attribution of mixed emotions and their 
understanding of mixed emotions.  
Unexpectedly, no relations were found between children’s attribution of emotions 
and justifications and their social history assessed with parents’ ways of talking about 
disciplinary situations and children’s number of siblings.  These results contrast with 
previous research reporting relations between the way parents talk with children about 
the social and moral world (e.g., how parents deal with disciplinary situations) and 
children’s moral understanding and moral behavior (e.g., Dunn, Brown, & Maguire, 1995; 
Kochanska, Gross, Lin, & Nichols, 2002; Laible & Thompson, 2000, 2002; Zahn-Waxler, 
Radke-Yarrow, & King, 1979).  These results suggest that the way parents talk about 
disciplinary situations does not play a key role in children’s development of an 
understanding of emotions in victimization scenarios.  Previous studies in which the 
relation between the way parents talk with children about disciplinary situations and 
children’s social understanding have been investigated usually include 3- and 4-year old 
children as these studies usually investigate children’s understanding of first order false 
beliefs as a measure of children’s social understanding.  In the present study, 
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participants were older than 5 years of age, so it possible that the way parents talk about 
disciplinary situations in terms of others’ emotions and mental states may be important 
for younger children’s social understanding but not for older children.  Other and more 
sophisticated aspects of parents talk with their children might be investigated as critical 
for older children’s development of their social and moral understanding.  However, in 
the present study, there was a low frequency of parents’ answers reporting references to 
the victim’s feelings and emotional states.  This low variability of parents’ answers may 
explain the lack of association between the way parents talk about disciplinary situations 
and children attribution of emotions and their justifications.  Other ways of assessing the 
way parents talk about disciplinary situations, such as naturalistic observations or 
controlled procedures that elicit parents’ ways of taking about disciplinary situations or 
about different aspects of the moral world (e.g., Racine, Carpendale, & Turnbull, 2006, 
2007), should be considered in future research.  
A sibling effect related to children’s understanding of victimization scenarios was 
not observed in the present study.  Previous research has shown that children with older 
siblings pass false belief tasks earlier than children with no siblings (e.g., Jenkins & 
Astington, 1996; Perner, Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994).  In the present study, children’s 
attribution of emotions in victimization scenarios was not related to the presence of 
siblings or older siblings in these children’s lives.  These results are in line with several 
studies that report no relation between children’s number of siblings and their social 
understanding.  For example, in one study (Jenkins & Astington, 1996) it was found that 
the effect of the family size in children’s development of false belief understanding was 
moderated by children’s language ability.  Specifically, the family size showed to be 
strongly associated with children’s understanding of false beliefs when children’s 
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language ability was low but not when children’s language was high.  As in the present 
study language ability was not assessed it was not possible to investigate this possibility.  
Some studies have proposed that the quality of sibling relationships, such as children’s 
strategies to resolve conflict with siblings, is a critical variable for the development of 
children’s understanding of second-order false belief understanding (Recchia & Howe, 
2009).  Therefore, it might be that variables such as the quality of the siblings 
relationship, and not just the number of siblings, may be related to children’s 
understanding of emotions in victimization situations.  Future research aiming to 
understand the relation between children’s understanding of victimization scenarios and 
children’s social life should also explore these possibilities. 
Finally, children’s emotion attributions in victimization situations have been 
considered a motivational force for children’s behavior (Arsenio, 2010; Blasi, 1980, 1983, 
1995; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984).  Children’s attribution of emotions in any versions of 
the happy victimizer task investigated in this study was not correlated with teachers’ 
reports of children’s aggressive behavior.  Contrary to my prediction, children’s 
attribution of emotions and justifications in the modified version of task were not 
correlated with teachers’ reports of children’s aggressive behavior.  These results are 
consistent with other studies reporting no relation between children’s attribution of 
emotions and antisocial behavior (Arsenio & Fleiss, 1996; Hughes & Dunn, 2000).  
However, they are contrary to results reported in the recent meta-analysis conducted by 
Malti and Krettenauer (2012) according to which children’s attribution of emotions are 
related to children’s antisocial and prosocial behavior.  Several hypotheses may explain 
these results.  First, children’s behavior measures were broad measures of behavior.  In 
this kind of behavioral measure the items used to assess behavior, namely, aggressive 
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behavior, are based on overt aggressive behavior (e.g., starts fights with peers, when 
teased, strikes back).  Measures of one specific domain, for example, stealing, might be 
more closely related to emotions attributions about stealing situations (Malti & 
Krettenauer, 2012).  Second, other reports, such as teachers’ reports, may also report a 
biased subjective perception of the child’s behavior.  The use of other measures of 
behavior such as peer nominations, self reports or behavior observation should be 
investigated as the use of different measures enables controlling for possible biases.  In 
the present study, I planned to have two measures of behavior, one from parents’ 
reports and another from teachers.  Parents’ reports did not prove to be a reliable 
measure, a result that compromised the possibility of having more than one measure of 
behavior. 
Concerning parent’s ratings of their children’s behavior, the present results 
obtained from parents’ answers on the Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire were not 
reliable. This is difficult to understand because several studies have been conducted 
with Portuguese samples that have supported the psychometric qualities of this 
questionnaire (Marzocchi, et al., 2004)  
The present study aimed to expand the study of children’s understanding of 
emotions in victimization scenarios by proposing an improved task to assess children’s 
understanding of emotions addressing some flaws in the standard version of the happy 
victimizer task.  I also investigated some cognitive processes that may underlie 
children’s emotion attributions in victimization scenarios, the relation between some 
aspects of children’s social history and children’s emotion attributions, and the relation 
between children’s emotion attributions in different versions of the happy victimizer task 
and their antisocial behavior.  In addition to the study limitations discussed above, others 
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should also be mentioned.  First, the present study was cross sectional.  Longitudinal 
studies are crucial for investigating the development of individual pathways of children’s 
emotion attributions in victimization scenarios, and the precursors of children’s 
understanding of emotions in moral contexts.  Second, all of the tasks used in the 
present study (i.e., attribution of emotions, understanding of interpretation and mixed 
emotions) are highly verbally dependent.  However, verbal ability was not controlled.  It 
is possible that children’s performance on these tasks was confounded with children’s 
verbal ability.  Third, overall, I argue that the anticipated emotions version involving a 
hypothetical victimizer is an improved version of the happy victimizer task because it 
separates intention from the outcome.  However, it is still possible that in the anticipated 
emotions version of the task questioning about the potential feelings that a hypothetical 
character may experience if he or she commits an immoral action may trigger an 
understanding of that character as a bad person with a bad intention.  This can lead to 
the attribution of positive emotions that are more related to a character-goal relationship 
than to a moral perspective on the situation.  Also, the anticipated emotions version of 
the task used in this study is not free of possible socially desirable answers.  Further 
research using independent measures of propensity for social desirability answers 
should be developed in order to control for this possible effect.  
Finally, studies with the happy victimizer paradigm attempt to evaluate an 
emotional dimension of children’s morality and motivation for moral behavior. However, 
they still take a conscious verbal understanding approach to emotions and do not assess 
children’s actual experience of emotions in moral situations.  Rather the happy victimizer 
task, in its various versions, assesses children’s verbal awareness of their own 
emotional experiences or children’s verbal awareness of emotions that should be 
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experienced in victimization scenarios.  This conscious verbal understanding approach 
to the emotional dimension of children’s morality may be a limitation to the happy-
victimizer studies, and so a limitation of the present study.  In order to understand how 
children develop an understanding of emotions in victimization scenarios the relation 
between children’s emotional experiences in real life situations and their emotion 
attributions in victimization scenarios, as well as the relations between children’s social 
experiences, namely the way parents talk about emotions and moral situations, and their 
emotion attributions should be investigated.  Also, other aspects of children’s functioning 
such children’s executive function abilities and self regulation should be investigated as 
variables that could be considered as mediators of the relation between children’s 
understanding of emotions in victimization scenarios and children’s moral behavior  
Despite its limitations, this study provides useful insights for the study of 
children’s understanding of emotions in victimization scenarios and its relation to 
children’s morality.  Primarily, this study has highlighted some problematic aspects of the 
standard version of the happy victimizer task that constrain inferences that can be drawn 
regarding children’s morality from their attribution of emotions in that version of the task.  
The present study raised hypotheses about possible processes such as children’s social 
understanding and children’s social history that could be related to children’s attribution 
of emotions in victimization scenarios.  Although results in the present study showed no 
relationships between children’s social understanding and their emotion attributions in 
victimization scenarios, further research should explore other aspects of individual 
variables (e.g., aspects of social understanding other than the ones used in this study) 
as well as other critical variables of children’s social interactions that may allow learning 
about the processes that are related to children’s understanding of emotions in 
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victimization scenarios, and how this understanding develops from early childhood to 
adolescence. Finally, the present study highlights the importance of understanding 
whether children’s attributions of emotions in victimization scenarios may constitute a 
good measure of children’s moral motivation and suggests that measures other than the 
attribution of emotions in the standard version of the happy victimizer task should be 
explored in order to understand children’s antisocial behavior. 
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Appendix A.  
 
Parental Styles Questionnaire 
Disciplinary situations presented: 
1. Can you remember a time recently when you thought your child was lying to you? 
Yes or No.  
What did you (would you) say or do? 
2. Can you remember a time recently when your child did something such as pushing 
another child in a playground to get something that he/she wanted? 
Yes or No.  
What did you (would you) say or do? 
3. Can you remember a time recently when your child teased or hit another child? 
Yes or No.  
What did you (would you) say or do? 
4. Can you remember a time recently when your child took something that wasn’t his or 
hers from somebody else? 
Yes or No.  
What did you (would you) say or do? 
5. Can you remember a time recently when your child shouted at you or your husband, 
made fun of either of you, or referred to you or your husband in some unflattering 
way? 
Yes or No.  
What did you (would you) say or do? 
6. Can you remember a time recently when your child purposely damaged something 
that wasn’t hers/his (e.g., a friend’s toy, a neighbour’s garden)? 
Yes or No.  
What did you (would you) say or do? 
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Appendix B.  
 
Questionnaire for Demographic Variables 
• Composition of the household 
Number of older siblings: _______ Sex:_______ 
Ages: _______ 
Number of younger siblings:______ Sex: _______ 
Ages: ________ 
 
• Parents 
Mother: 
Age: ______ Education: _____________ Occupation: ____________________ 
 
Father: 
Age: ______ Education: _____________ Occupation: ____________________ 
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Appendix C.  
 
Parents’ Ratings of Children’s Behavior 
SDQ – Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire 
Conduct problems Scale 
1. Often has temper tantrums or hot tempers. 
2. Generally obedient, usually does what adults request. 
3. Often fights with other children or bullies them. 
4. Often lies or cheats.  
5. Steals from home, school or elsewhere. 
 
Prosocial Scale 
1. Considerate of other people’s feelings. 
2. Shares readily with other children (treats, toys, pencils, etc). 
3. Helpful if someone is hurt, upset or feeling ill. 
4. Kind with younger children. 
5. Often volunteers to help others (parents, teachers, other children). 
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Appendix D.  
 
Teachers’ Ratings of Children’s Behavior 
Reactive aggression 
1. When teased, strikes back  
2. Blames others in fights 
3. Overreacts angrily to accidents 
General aggression 
1. Teases and name-calls 
2. Starts fights with peers  
3. Gets into verbal arguments 
4. When frustrated, is quick to fight 
5. Breaks rules in games 
6. Responds negatively when fails 
Proactive aggression 
1. Uses physical force to dominate  
2. Gets others to gang up on a peer 
3. Threatens and bullies others 
Each item is scored on a 5-point scale from never to almost always. 
